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THE CONVERGENCE OF I.R.C. § 104(a)(2),
NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY CO.
V. LIEPELT AND STRUCTURED TORT
SETTLEMENTS: TAX POLICY "DERAILED"
LAWRENCE A. FROLIK*
INTRODUCTION

S INCE

its inception, the Internal Revenue Code (Code) has exempted from taxation amounts received as damages for personal
injuries.' That exemption is presently encoded in section 104(a)(2) ,2
which except for minor deviations, 3 provides that amounts received on
account of personal injuries are excluded from gross income. Over the
years, the exemption has attracted little criticism. Most commentators
have concluded that the exclusion is justified on humanitarian

* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law; B.A. 1966, Nebraska; J.D. 1969, L.L.M. 1972, Harvard.
1. In 1919 Congress enacted § 213(b)(6), the predecessor of § 104(a)(2), to
provide that tort damages are to be excluded from gross income. Revenue Act of
1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919). The legislative
history of the section indicates that Congress thought it doubtful that amounts
received through accident or health insurance, or under workmen's compensation
acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness are required to be included in
gross income. H.R. Rep. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1918); see Nordstrom,
Income Tax And Personal Injury Awards, 19 Ohio St. L.J. 212, 222-23 & n.49
(1958). Prior to the enactment of § 213(b)(6), the predecessor of § 104(a)(2), the
nontaxable nature of personal injury awards was questionable. Early regulations
promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue sought to tax amounts received as the result of personal injuries by analogizing them to insurance proceeds.
Treas. Reg. 33 (Rev.) art. 4,
25, 20, Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 130 (1918). Shortly
thereafter, however, the Attorney General, in response to an inquiry by the Treasury
Department, stated that insurance proceeds were "'capital' as distinguished from
'income' receipts." 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304, 308 (1918). As a result, the Commissioner
reversed his position and held that because insurance proceeds were not taxable as
income, damages received from suit or settlement for personal injuries were also to be
excluded. T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918). This position was subsequently codified in § 213(b)(6).
2. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1976), as amended by The Act Relating to Periodic
Payments, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 70 Stand. Fed. Tax Reports (No. 4, extra edition)
(CCH) 503 (Jan. 17, 1983). Section 104(a)(2) now reads:
[e]xcept in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions
allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior
taxable year, gross income does not include- . . . (2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as
periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness . ...
3. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
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grounds even if it is at variance with tax theory. 4 The inequities
between personal injury victims and other taxpayers produced by
section 104(a)(2) have been tolerated if not condoned by Congress.
Two separate, recent developments, however, call into question the
continued desirability of section 104(a)(2). On January 14, 1983,
Congress amended section 104(a)(2) expressly to exclude from gross
income amounts received as damages for personal injuries "whether
[paid] as lump sums or as periodic payments." 5 This amendment
codifies the position previously taken by the IRS,6 a position which has
led to the increased use of periodic payments, or as they are often
called, 7 structured settlements, to satisfy personal injury tort claims. A
portion of each periodic payment represents investment or interest
income on a principal amount which might otherwise have been paid
to the personal injury claimant had he accepted a lump-sum payment.
If a claimant were to receive this amount and invest it himself, he
would be taxed on the resulting income. Thus, excluding the entire
amount of these periodic payments from gross income produces "horizontal" inequities in the tax treatment of personal injury claimants.,
Those claimants who accept a deferred payment arrangement receive
more favorable tax treatment than those claimants who accept lumpsum settlements.
This Article contends that the disparate tax treatment of these
similarly situated claimants is not based on economic reality and
should be eliminated. Congress should repeal the 1983 amendment

4. See Harnett, Torts And Taxes, 27 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 614, 625-27 (1952) (suggesting that the exclusion is "rooted in emotional ... rather than logical, factors...
the victim is more to be pitied rather than taxed."); 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1495, 1496
(1956) (arguing that a benevolent intent can be inferred either from lack of corrective
action or from emotional and traditional reasoning). Contra Note, PersonalInjuries:
Should Non-Taxability of Judgements DecreaseAward?, 8 Tulsa L.J. 242, 244 &
n.15 (1972) ("[t]he only evidence ... tending to show a legislative intent to confer an
award free from tax considerations [is] ...in the opinions of [the] various courts.")
[hereinafter cited as Personal Injuries]
5. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1976), as amended by The Act Relating to Periodic
Payments, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 70 Stand. Fed. Tax Reports (No. 4, extra edition)
(CCH) 503 (Jan. 17, 1983).
6. H.R. Rep. No. 832, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982), reprinted in 70 Stand.
Fed. Tax Reports (No. 4, extra edition) (CCH) 503 (Jan. 17, 1983).
7. See Corboy, Structured Injustice: Compulsory Periodic Payment of Judgements, 66 A.B.A. J. 1524 (1980); Verbeck & Michaels, Structured Settlements and
the Uniform Periodic Payments Act, 29 Fed'n Ins. Couns. Q. 17 (1978).
8. Throughout this article the term "claimant" will be used to denote the person
who claims to have been the victim of a personal injury. The term is favored over the
less neutral term "victim," or the term "plaintiff' which assumes the existence of a
case in litigation. The claimant is the term employed by the Model Periodic Payment
of Judgments Act § 3(c)(3)(i), 14 U.L.A. 24 (Supp. 1983).
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and the doctrine of economic benefit9 should be applied to periodic
payments of damage awards thereby divesting them of their favored
tax treatment.
The second development undercutting the widom of the section
104(a)(2) exclusion is the 1980 Supreme Court decision in Norfolk &
Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt.10 The Court held that the effect of
income taxes should be considered in assessing damages for personal
injuries in cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA)."I This holding will result in reducing damage awards for lost
earnings to a figure net of taxes, causing defendants to become the
beneficiary of the section 104(a)(2) exemption. Moreover, Liepelt,
although it has generated little interest or comment, 12 if properly
understood in relation to section 104(a)(2), promises to accelerate the
use of structured settlements. In light of these two unfortunate byproducts of the Liepelt decision, this Article recommends that Congress amend the section to remove the tax exemption for any amounts
paid as compensation for lost earnings.
I.

SECTION

104(a)(2)

AND PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGE AwARDs

Injured parties often initially claim extraordinarily high damages
without attempting to verify the source or cause of the figure. 13 Once
the publicity of the initial complaint has passed, however, the claimant's attorney must get down to the business of calculating realistic
and provable damages. The initial step is to characterize the damages,
although if the parties go to trial it is questionable whether the jury
pays much attention to detailed calculations of damages. 14 Instead,
juries often apply their own "common sense" view of the amount of
9. The doctrine has been addressed, but surprisingly rejected by the IRS. Rev.
Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74. See infra pt. II(B).
10. 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
11. Id. at 497-98.
12. Apart from a handful of student law review comments and cursory, descriptive discussions, the case has received little scholarly comment or attention. See, e.g.,
Tiffany, Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt Torpedoes Jones Act Damages, 24
Trial Law. Guide 145 (1980); Comment, Income Taxation and the Calculation of

Tort DamageAwards: The Ramifications of Norfolk & Western Railway v. Liepelt,
38 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 289 (1981) [hereinafter cited as DamageAwards]; 66 A.B.A.
J. 488 (1980); 26 Loy. L. Rev. 409 (1980); 21 Santa Clara L. Rev. 873 (1981). An
exception is the article by Crick, Taxes, Lost Future Earnings, and Unexamined
Assumptions, 34 Nat'l Tax J. 271 (1981).
13. The National Law Journal stated: "Many lawyers feel a pressure to file
inflated claims for general and punitive damages, which are not related to direct outof-pocket losses. Indeed, it's almost axiomatic that attorneys will sue for the moon
and settle for a small slice of cheese." 3 Nat'l L.J., July 27, 1981, at 1, col. 4.
14. See McWeeney v. New York R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1960) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting); The Annual C.J. Earl Warren Conf. on Ad. in the U.S.,
Final Report on the American Jury System 68, 70 (1977); R. Simon, The Jury: Its
Role in American Society 57 (1980); 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1495, 1495 (1956).
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damages. 15 Nevertheless, plaintiffs' attorneys and commentators regularly categorize damages in bewildering, elaborate systems.' 0
From the standpoint of federal income taxation, a breakdown of
the damage award by categories is both unnecessary and irrelevant
because no portion of the damage award is taxable. Damage payments for personal injury have been exempted from gross income since
1918,' 7 and it is therefore of no moment whether the amount represents reimbursement for lost earnings, or payment for the loss of an
eye.' But, of course, since it is an income tax matter, there are
exceptions to the rule.
At least one opportunity presents itself for including certain
amounts of the damage award in gross income; it arises from the
deductibility of medical expenses as provided by section 213.'1 If the
claimant, in years prior to the damage award, has deducted the
medical expenses he incurred for which the damage award is intended
as reimbursement, he must report those reimbursed expenses as income in the year received. 20 In short, the earlier deduction is reversed,
and the tax savings that it generated are offset by the taxation of the

15. As a result, special interrogatories are often requested. See, e.g., Hayes v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 1214, 1216 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Blancher v. Samuels,
354 So. 2d 213, 222-23 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Thibeault v. Brown, 92 N.H. 235, 237,
29 A.2d 461, 462-63 (1942); Louissaint v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 111 Misc. 2d
122, 123-24, 443 N.Y.S.2d 678, 679 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Sawdey v. Schwenk, 2 Wis. 2d
532, 534, 87 N.W.2d 500, 502 (1958); O'Quinn, Common Elements of Recovery in
Personal Injury Cases, 18 S. Tex. L.J. 179, 214 (1976). Most civil cases in federal
courts are resolved by a general verdict. Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure makes available two procedures as discretionary alternatives to the general
verdict. Under subdivision (b) the judge may, if he sees fit, ask the jury to return a
general verdict, but to accompany it with answers to certain interrogatories about
particular issues in the case. Under subdivision (a) the court is given authority to
dispense with the general verdict altogether, and to submit the various issues in the
case to the jury in the form of individual fact questions, on each of which the jury is
to return a special verdict. Fed. R. Civ. P. 49; see 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 250, at 484-86 (1971).
16. See Karon, Developing Evidence of Damages in Personal Injury Actions, 3
Trial Dipl. J. 14, 14-19 (Fall 1980) (3 categories); Nace, A Checklist for Maximizing
Damages, 17 Trial 43, 43 (June 1981) (7 categories); Nordstrom, supra note 1, at 21516 (4 categories); O'Quinn, supra note 15, at 179 (7 categories).
17. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066
(1919). Even before the passage of the Revenue Act of 1918, the Commissioner
exempted damage awards for personal injuries from gross income in T.D. 2747, 20
Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918).
18. Awards paid for loss of life are also expressly excluded from gross income by
I.T. 2420, 7-2 C.B. 123 (1928).
19. I.R.C. § 213 (West Supp. 1982).
20. If the taxpayer's settlement received for personal injuries does not specify the
amount that represents reimbursement for past or future medical expenses, the IRS
will presume that the amount received is attributable first to past medical expenses
previously deducted because that amount is a sum certain. Rev. Rul. 75-230, 1975-1
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reimbursement in the year of its receipt. 21 If the claimant's marginal
tax rate in the year of the inclusion is the same as it was in the year of
deduction, neither the government nor the taxpayer has benefited,
except that the taxpayer enjoyed a modest tax-free "loan" from the
government. Admittedly, the reversal of the earlier deduction by the
inclusion of the reimbursement in gross income is a crude method,
prone to favoring either the taxpayer or the government depending on
the tax rate applied to the deduction compared to the tax rate applied
to the later inclusion.22 But it is accurate enough in light of the need
for an administratively convenient rule. Moreover, such treatment
does adhere to the fundamental tax principles that each tax year
should be "sealed off" from the other and that2 the
income tax operates
3
on an annual rather than transactional basis.
C.B. 93, 93. The Ruling holds that if a settlement expressly allocates a portion of the
amount as reimbursement for past medical expenses, then the amount of past expenses incurred and deducted in a prior year will be includible in gross income in the
year of receipt. Id. at 93-94. Another ruling, Rev. Rul. 79-427, 1979-2 C.B. 120, 12021, accords similar treatment in both of the above-mentioned situations if the award
results from a judgment following trial instead of a settlement.
21. An analogous situation, also traceable to the deductibility of medical expenses under § 213, is worth noting. The IRS has ruled that out-of-pocket medical
expenses (otherwise qualifying for deductibility under § 213) will not be deductible to
the extent they have been prospectively reimbursed by an earlier damage award.
When a settlement specifically allocates an amount of future medical expenses, all
medical expenses paid after receipt of settlement will be deductible only to the extent
that they exceed the amount allocated by the settlement. Rev. Rul. 75-232, 1975-1
C.B. 94. A later ruling, Rev. Rul. 79-427, 1979-2 C.B. 120, by incorporation of Rev.
Rul. 75-232, inferentially dictates that a damage award should be treated similarly.
This treatment bars a double recovery: Because the expense was reimbursed with taxfree dollars, the expense cannot be allowed to generate tax savings by way of a
deduction. Rev. Rul. 79-427, 1979-2 C.B. 120. If, on the other hand, the taxpayer
receives a damage award for personal injury damages that does not specify the
amount allocated to the various elements of the damage, Rev. Rul. 79-427, 1979-2
C.B. 120 holds that an amount properly allocable to future medical expenses is
determinable from the evidence presented by the taxpayer at trial and by the itemization presented upon appeal. Thus, future medical expenses will be deductible only
to the extent that they exceed the portion of the award so allocated. The validity of
this Ruling as to the allocation of lump-sum damage awards is questionable in light
of the holding in Niles v. United States, 520 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Cal. 1981), in which
the court refused to follow the rationale of Rev. Rul. 79-427, and declared that the
IRS lacked the authority to allocate a portion of a lump-sum personal injury award to
future medical expenses. Id. at 813. Citing the lump-sum nature of the jury verdict,
the court held that the award could not be allocated into its component parts with
any degree of certainty. Id. at 812.
22. Since the additional income that arises from reimbursement represents an
add-on to other income, it is taxed at the taxpayer's highest marginal rate. If all other
factors remain constant, the marginal rate is likely to be higher in the year of
reimbursement than in the year of the deduction. The addition of income in the year
of reimbursement may boost the taxable income into a higher bracket, whereas in the
year of deduction, part or all of the deduction may offset income of a lower bracket,
thus reducing the value of the deduction.
23. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365-66 (1931).
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Absent this exception, section 104(a)(2) grants tax-free status to
personal injury damage awards. 24 This exclusion of income produces
inequity in that taxpayers other than personal injury victims with
equal consumable incomes are subject to taxation. That is, $20,000 of
disposable income received as a payment or reimbursement for personal injury is free of taxes, while $20,000 of wages are subject to taxes
and correspondingly produce less disposable income. This unequal
treatment is seen most dramatically in the exclusion from taxation of
damage awards that represent reimbursement for lost earnings (either
future or past). The section 104(a)(2) exemption favors earnings that
are "earned" by virtue of being paid as a damage award, over earnings that are "earned" (i.e. wages) by the efforts of the taxpayer.
Section 104(a) (2), however, does not fully shield damage awards for
lost earnings from taxation. The investment earnings made possible by
a lump-sum settlement are included in gross income.2 5 Because the
lump-sum award for loss of future earnings will be discounted to
account for the acceleration of what would have been income arising
over a number of years, the dollar figure of the damage award will be
less than the arithmetical total of the lost future wages.2 6 For example,

24. In part, § 104(a)(2) is a "tax expenditure" because it subsidizes injured parties
by its failure to tax their damage awards: the amount of the subsidy being dependent
upon the marginal tax rate of the claimant. A "tax expenditure" is any provision of
the Code that promotes social or economic objectives through the use of deductions,
credits, exclusionary exemptions, deferrals or preferential rates. Such an item is
considered an "expenditure" because the goal might have been achieved by way of a
direct expenditure from the budget. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparisonwith Direct Government Expenditures,
83 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 706 (1970).
25. Of course, any additional interest income that a claimant might realize by
personally investing a portion of a periodic payment after its actual receipt would be
included in gross income as well. This Article, however, focuses on the disparate
treatment of the investment income portion of the periodic payment itself and its
practical equivalent, the earnings derived from the investment of a lump-sum settlement to offset the discount to present value.
26. For many years courts have recognized that lump-sum awards for future
damages had to be discounted to present value. The "adequate allowance [must] be
made, according to circumstances, for the [future] earning power of money." Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 491 (1916). The proper rate is often in
debate. Compare Blue v. Western Ry., 469 F.2d 487, 497 (5th Cir. 1972) (the rate of
discount is equal to the appropriate rate of interest that could be anticipated over the
remaining work-life of the plaintiff), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 956 (1973) with Wilkinson v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Kisen, K.K., 366 F. Supp. 110, 117 (D. Md. 1973) (held
appropriate to use the present high interest rates of 5% to determine the rate of
discount), modified mem., 538 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1976). The argument is not merely
between short-term versus long-term interest rates, but also as to what kinds of
investments. The general rule is that one looks to a reasonable rate of return from
conservative investments. See, e.g., Johnson v. International Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d
1279, 1283 (La. Ct. App. 1977). Another issue to consider is whether the effects of
inflation should be considered and thereby reduce or offset the discount. Most
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if the injured party suffered a loss of $20,000 of future earnings per
year for ten years, assuming a discount rate of 10 %, the $200,000 of
lost earnings would have a present value of $122,891. Thus, because
the interest income earned by investing the discounted damage award
is taxable, the total after-tax consumable dollars available to the
claimant will be less than the total pre-tax lost earnings. In our
example, the claimant would receive $122,891 as the discounted value
of the lost earnings. If he were to invest it at a 10 % rate of interest he
could consume $20,000 for 10 years if the interest were tax-free. But
section 104(a)(2) does not exempt the investment interest earned by a
lump-sum damage award or settlement, and so the after-tax rate of
return will be less than 10 % and the consumable
income will amount
27
to something less than $20,000 per year.
The claimant is not necessarily disadvantaged by this outcome; had
he not been injured and continued to work the resulting earnings
would have been taxed. The consumable income would have been
$20,000 per year less the income taxes owed. Indeed it is likely that the
lump-sum damage settlement resulted in more consumable income as
only a portion of the lost earnings, in our example the interest earned
on the $20,000, was taxed, while if the taxpayer had earned the
$20,000, the entire amount of it would have been included in gross
income.
The tax exemption of section 104(a)(2) also produces inequity between taxpayers who incur reimbursable medical expenses and those
who incur nonreimbursable medical expenses. To the extent that
commentators agree that inflation should be considered with the result that the rate
of discount would be lowered to a true "real" return, as opposed to the interest that
merely maintains the purchasing power of the original lump-sum award. E.g.,
Formuzis & O'Donnell, Inflation and the Valuation of Future Economic Losses, 38
Mont. L. Rev. 297, 303-04 (1977); Henderson, The Consideration of Increased
Productivity and the Discounting of Future Earnings to Present Value, 20 S.D.L.
Rev. 307, 310 (1975); Note, Future Inflation, Prospective Damages, and the Circuit
Courts, 63 Va. L. Rev. 105, 133 (1977). Nor is there agreement as to which elements
of a damage award must be reduced to present worth, i.e. discounted. Logically, any
damage payment that represents reimbursement for an expense, lost earnings, or
suffering that will occur in the future should be discounted. In cases arising under
FELA, damage awards for future lost earnings or medical expenses must be discounted, but damage awards for future pain and suffering are not. O'Byrne v. St.
Louis S.W. Ry., 632 F.2d 1285, 1286 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Texas & Pac. Ry.
v. Buckles, 232 F.2d 257, 264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 984 (1956). States
vary whether to discount the damages for pain and suffering. Compare Oberhelman
v. Blount, 196 Neb. 42, 49, 241 N.W.2d 355, 360 (1976) (future pain and suffering
must be reduced to present worth) with St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Dillingham, 112 Ga. App. 422, 424, 145 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1965) (no reduction to present
value for future pain and suffering).
27. For example, if the tax rate were 20 %, the after-tax rate of return would be
8%, and the taxpayer could consume only $17,891 per year (assuming no change in
the marginal rate of taxation).
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nonreimbursed medical expenses result in a deduction under section
213(a), reimbursed and nonreimbursed expenses are treated alike: In
both instances the income devoted to medical expenses is relieved from
taxation. Section 213(a), however, permits medical expense deduc-

tions only to the extent such expenses exceed 5% of adjusted gross
income (AGI) .28 Up to the threshold of 5% of AGI, the taxpayer must
pay for medical expenses with after-tax dollars. Because no such
comparable threshold exists for exempt reimbursement payments, section 104(a)(2) grants greater tax relief to reimbursed taxpayers than
section 213(a) grants to nonreimbursed parties. In addition, some
nonreimbursed taxpayers will be ineligible for the section 213(a) deduction because it is an itemized deduction per section 63.29 If the
taxpayer lacks a sufficient amount of itemized deductions, none of the
nonreimbursed medical expenses will be deductible
and they will have
30
to be paid entirely with after-tax dollars.
II.

STRucTru

TORT SETTLEMENTS

The above-discussed inequities engendered by section 104(a)(2)
might be borne as an unfortunate, but unavoidable consequence of an
understandable congressional desire to assist personal injury victims.
Other inequities, however-horizontal inequities-exist among personal injury claimants because of the current tax treatment 3' of deferred payment arrangements (structured settlements), which are frequently used to settle personal injury claims. Those claimants who
accept a deferred payment arrangement receive more favorable tax
treatment than those claimants who accept a lump-sum settlement.
The term structured settlement refers to the practice by which the
claimant agrees to be paid over a number of years or to be paid an
32
annuity for life rather than accepting a fixed, lump-sum amount.

28. I.R.C. § 213(a) (1976).
29. A taxpayer is eligible to itemize under I.R.C. § 63(c) (Supp. V 1981) if he has
"excess" deductions, or total deductions that exceed the applicable zero bracket
amount as defined in I.R.C. § 63(d) (Supp. V 1981).
30. The vast majority of taxpayers who benefit from itemization are those entitled to a mortgage interest deduction per § 163. In 1978, 89.8 million individual
income tax returns were filed with 25.8 million, or 29% of the returns, claiming
itemized deductions. Of those returns claiming itemized deductions, 19.8 million, or
77%, claimed a deduction for home mortgage interest. In 1979, 92.7 million returns
were filed with 26.5 million, or 29% of the returns claiming itemized deductions,
and 20.9 million or 79 %, claimed a deduction for home mortgage interest. Internal
Revenue Statistics of Income-1979, Individual Income Tax Returns 1, 31, 35
(1982); Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income-1978, Individual Tax Returns
55 (1981).
31. See infra pt. II(A).
32. Choulos, Structured Settlements: Cure or Curse? 16 Trial 73, 73-74 (Nov.
1980); Corboy, supra note 7, passim; Elligett, The PeriodicPayment of Judgments,
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Expenses incurred by the claimant prior to the settlement are usually
reimbursed by a lump-sum payment, while future anticipated damages are compensated by subsequent periodic payments.3 3 The payments may be a fixed amount, a fixed amount adjustable for inflation,
3 4
or an amount varying according to the future needs of the claimant.
In some instances, the parties may ignore any total calculation of
damages and merely agree to a monthly or annual figure sufficient to
meet the projected financial needs of the victim .3
Once the parties have agreed on the amount of the periodic pay-

ment, the defendant is free to seek out the least expensive way to fulfill
his obligation.3 6 Although some use is made of irrevocable, funded
trusts (the claimant being the beneficiary), the preferred method is to
purchase an annuity payable to the claimant for the prescribed period
of time.37 Defendants generally hide the actual cost of the annuity

46 Ins. Couns. J. 130, 131 (1979); Fuller, Paying Tomorrow's Claims with Tomorrow's Dollars, 3 Litigation 27, 28 (Fall 1976); Henderson, Periodic Payments of
Bodily Injury Awards, 66 A.B.A. J. 734, passim (June 1980); Hindert, Periodic
Payment of Personal Injury Damages, 31 Fed'n Ins. Couns. Q. 3, 3 (Fall 1980);
Krause, Structured Settlements for Tort Victims, 66 A.B.A. J. 1527, 1528 (Dec.
1980); Lilly, Alternatives to Lump Sum Payments in PersonalInjury Cases, 44 Ins.
Couns. J. 243, 243 (1977); Moore, The Use of Annuities in the Settlement of Personal
Injury Cases, 49 Ins. Couns. J. 50, passim (1982); Rea, Lump-Sum Versus Periodic
DamageAwards, 10 J. Legal Stud. 131, 131 (1981); Sedgwick & Judge, The Use of
Annuities in Settlement of Personal Injury Cases, 41 Ins. Couns. J. 584, 584-85
(1974); Verbeck & Michaels, supra note 7, passim; Annuities to Settle Cases, 42 Ins.
Couns. J. 367, 374 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Annuities].
33. See, e.g., Choulos, supra note 32, at 75; Elligett, supra note 32, at 135;
Hindert, supra note 32, at 3 n.2, 5; Krause, supra note 32, at 1528.
34. See, e.g., Lilly, supra note 32, at 243; Sedgwick & Judge, supra note 32, at
585; Annuities, supra note 32, at 367, 379-80.
35. See, e.g., Verbeck & Michaels, supra note 7, at 21; Annuities, supra note 32,
at 369.
36. The defendant's choices may be limited by the requirement that the payments be assured. Some states which have legislatively provided for the periodic
payment of medical malpractice judgments require the defendant to post security
adequate to assure all future payments. E.g., Ala. Code § 6-5-486(4) (1975); Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 667.7(a) (West 1980); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.51(1)(b)(2) (West
Supp. 1982). The Model Uniform Periodic Payment of Judgments Act § 8(a), 14
U.L.A. 33-34 (Supp. 1983) is a comprehensive security section requiring the defendant/debtor to post court-approved security by one or a combination of:
1. bond executed by a qualified insurer;
2. annuity contract executed by a qualified insurer;
3. evidence of applicable and collectible liability insurance with a qualified insurer;
4. an agreement by one or more qualified insurers to guarantee payment
of the judgment; or
5. any other satisfactory form of security.
37. See, e.g., Choulos, supra note 32, at 75 (annuities are the basic tool of
structured settlements); Elligett, supranote 32, at 144 (annuities cost twenty to thirty
percent less to purchase than the cost of setting up a trust fund); Hindert, supra note
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from the claimant since it is often considerably less than anticipated
by the claimant or less than the lump-sum amount that it supplanted.3 The cost of a lifetime annuity may be surprisingly low if the
claimant's life expectancy was severely diminished by the accident.3 9
However, because of this secretiveness, the parties, and the claimant's
counsel in particular, are free to publicly ascribe a large
value to the
40
settlement and thereby garner the attendant publicity.
A. Amended Section 104(a)(2) FostersHorizontal Inequity
On January 14, 1983, section 104(a)(2) was amended to provide
that damage awards received as periodic payments on account of
personal injuries are excluded from gross income. 41 The amendment
merely codified, rather than changed, the current interpretation of
the law. Prior to the amendment, the IRS had held that periodic
payments, including the portion of the deferred payments that repre42
sents interest earned on the deferred principal, are nontaxable.
Thus, the total amount of a deferred settlement payment escapes
taxation even though every periodic payment is comprised of a mix of
principal and 43investment income arising from the deferred portion of
the principal.
An equitable and consistent income tax should treat a claimant's
decision to receive an annuity (or the income from an irrevocable
trust) in lieu of outright receipt of the principal sum as providing

32, at 16-17 (while trusts offer several investment advantages over annuities, management expenses and tax liabilities upon distribution of a trust corpus may make
annuities a preferable funding device).
38. See, e.g., Choulos, supra note 32, at 75; Annuities, supra note 32, at 368.
39. See Fuller, supra note 32, at 27; Sedgwick & Judge, supra note 32, at 585-86;
Annuities, supra note 32, at 368.
40. See Verbeck & Michaels, supra note 7, at 19-20; Annuities, supra note 32, at
367-68; Nat'l L.J. Nov. 23, 1981, at 18, col. 3.
41. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1976), as amended by The Act Relating to Periodic
Payments, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 70 Stand. Fed. Tax Reports (No. 4, extra edition)
(CCH) 503 (Jan. 17, 1983).
42. Rev. Rul. 79-313, 1979-2 C.B. 75 (annually increasing payments from the
defendant's liability company are received as damages within the meaning of §
104(a)(2), subject to the limitation of Rev. Rul. 65-29); Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2
C.B. 74 (annuity payments from a policy owned by the defendant's liability company
are received as damages within the meaning of § 104(a)(2), subject to the limitations
of Rev. Rul. 65-29 1965-1 C.B. 59); Rev. Rul. 77-230, 1977-2 C.B. 214 (trust
distributions made from income or corpus of the trusts involved in this ruling are
received as damages within the meaning of § 104(a)(2)).
43. That a deferred payment consists of both principal and interest is most clear
in the event that the defendant purchases an annuity, payable to the claimant, as an
insured method of payment. Annuities, almost by definition, are a return of principal
together with interest. 1 B. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts
12.3.1 (5th ed. 1981).
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comparable economic benefit and, therefore, necessitating comparable taxation. Yet this is not the case. If, for example, rather than a
deferred payment, the claimant accepted a lump-sum settlement and
then invested it, the subsequent interest income would be included in
gross income. 44 If the claimant used the lump sum to purchase an
annuity, he would be taxed on that portion of the proceeds that
represented interest income. 45 In short, section 104(a)(2) does not
extend its protection to the income earned on invested damage
awards, even though the parties are likely to have anticipated such
earnings and calculated the amount of the settlement accordingly.
For purposes of consistency and equity, Congress should tax interest
income that is paid to the claimant even though the interest is earned
on principal that was not received by the claimant, but rather held or
invested for his benefit under a deferred payment plan. 46 The principal need not be retained by the defendant-payor, because the interest
is exempt even though earned by and paid through the use of an
annuity, or by a funded irrevocable trust.4 7 Given the inconsistent
taxation of the interest income, the current tax system impels wise
claimants to accept a deferred payout of the settlement, thereby obtaining the benefits of the section 104(a)(2) tax exemption for the
interest income earned upon the principal sum of the settlement.
Imagine two sixty-year old tort victims, X and Y, both of whom
suffer $100,000 in lost future earnings, the $100,000 figure being the
discounted value of their lost earnings for the next five years. If X
settles for a lump sum of $100,000 and invests it in 10 % corporate
bonds which mature in 5 years, X would have $10,000 a year taxable
income and a return of the $100,000 at the end of the fifth year. X
would have consumable income of $150,000 less the income taxes on

44. Rev. Rul. 65-29, 1965-1 C.B. 59.
45. I.R.C. § 72(b) (1976); see Hindert, supra note 32, at 9-10 (illustrating how
§ 72(b) operates).
46. Nor is tax exemption of the interest consistant with the treatment of interest
arising from other deferred payment arrangements. The interest portion of a taxpayer purchased annuity is taxable. I.R.C. § 72(a) (1976). Any interest resulting from
deferred payments of life insurance proceeds are taxable. The exemption for life
insurance proceeds applies only to the amount of the at-death benefit. I.R.C.
§ 101(d) (1976).
47. Deferred payments of damage awards may assume various forms. The purchase of an annuity payable to the claimant is the most widely used form. Moore,
supra note 32, at 50; Sedgwick & Judge, supra note 32, at 584. Another method is an
irrevocable funded trust usually with a bank trustee. When the obligation to pay the
claimant terminates, usually at the death of the claimant, the trust terminates. The
balance of the trust fund then reverts to the defendant or his insurer. Fuller, supra
note 32, at 29. A third possibility is to have the defendant's casualty insurer underwrite its own annuity plan. The insurer would set aside and invest a lump sum, the
income from which would be used to fulfill the periodic payment obligation. Verbeck & Michaels, supra note 7, at 19.
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the interest. If we assume a tax rate of 25%, X will pay $12,500 in
taxes ($10,000 x 5 x 25 %), leaving net income of $137,500. (A comparable result would occur if X had used the $100,000 to purchase a fiveyear annuity). If Y, on the other hand, chooses to accept deferred
payments of $10,000 per year for five years with a payment of
$100,000 at the end of the fifth year, Y's gross income would be
$150,000, all of which is tax free. (Again, the same result would occur
if Y had accepted a five-year annuity purchased at a cost of $100,000).
Obviously, such disparate tax treatment finds little justification in
economic realities. The chief difference in the above example between
X and Y is the retention by X of the power to consume the principal or
to choose the form of its investment. 48 X also retained the ability to
change investments or to terminate the investment and consume the
principal. This "freedom of choice," however, might not exist if X
purchased an annuity, or had invested in some similarly restrictive
investment. Even an apparently flexible investment might be subject
to any number of restraints that would discourage the recipient, as a
practical matter, from exercising the freedom of investment that was
apparently obtained by the acceptance of a lump-sum settlement. If,
for example, the recipient purchased long-term bonds as a means of
providing a stable income, and if interest rates subsequently rose, the
bonds would decline in value. To change investments, the recipient
would have to absorb a loss of principal; something he might not be
willing to accept. Still, in our example, X does have continuing "dominion and control" over the damage award, while Y surrendered
that control upon agreeing to a deferred payment arrangement. Does
that modest difference in control warrant such a difference in tax
treatment?
The doctrine of constructive receipt might seem to apply because it
calls for taxation based upon underlying economic realities rather
than the mere surface arrangements. 49 The relevant Revenue Rul-

48. The line between consumption and investment will not always be clear. A
disabled claimant might spend part of a lump sum on structural changes to his
housing so that he could care for himself, e.g. a modified kitchen. Alternatively, he
might invest the lump sum and use the income and principal to hire a cook to prepare
his meals. The outcome would be the same: The difference is one of using principal
to procure a labor-saving consumer durable versus using principal to employ labor.
49. The doctrine of constructive receipt originated as a means of preventing
taxpayers from artificially manipulating the timing of the taxation of their income by
refusing to accept income that was actually available to them. Ross v. Commissioner,
169 F.2d 483, 491 (1st Cir. 1948); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(i) (1973). A taxpayer is in
constructive receipt when "[i]ncome although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's
possession is constructively received by him in the taxable year during which it is
credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available so that he may
draw upon it at any time." Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1979).
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ings,5 0 however, which seem to be correct, hold that the doctrine of
constructive receipt is not applicable to periodic payments of tort
settlements. The Regulations define constructive receipt of income as
income "not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession," but which
"is credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made
available so that he may draw upon it at any time, or so that he could
have drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice of intention to
withdraw had been given." 5' 1 In short, the taxpayer "may not deliber'2
ately turn his back on income and select his year of reporting. .
Returning to our example, one might argue that Y constructively
received the $100,000 settlement at the moment in the negotiations
when, rather than agreeing to deferred periodic payments he could
have demanded immediate payment of the $100,000. The argument,
although appealing, must be rejected in light of the cases that have
considered when and how constructive receipt should apply to deferred compensation arrangements.5 3 Suffice it to say that the cases, 54
and the subsequent Revenue Rulings, 55 have decisively concluded that
the doctrine of constructive receipt does not govern the transaction
merely because the taxpayer negotiated a deferred compensation
agreement.56 Although deferred compensation is not completely analogous to a deferred payment damage award, the two are conceptually
close enough to allow the former to be instructive as to the latter.
Hence, the constructive receipt doctrine does not seem to justify taxation of periodic payments in the year of settlement.
B. A Proposed Solution-The "Economic Benefit Doctrine"
A better solution to the inequities of section 104(a)(2) would be the
repeal of the 1983 amendment and the application of the doctrine of
50. See supra note 43. Although not specifically on point, these rulings inferentially negate the applicability of the doctrine of constructive receipt to periodic
payments of damage awards.
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1979).
52. Metzer, ConstructiveReceipt, Economic Benefit and Assignment of Income:
A Case Study in Deferred Compensation, 29 Tax L. Rev. 525, 532 (1974).
53. For an exhaustive discussion of the application of the doctrine of constructive
receipt to the various forms of deferred compensation, see Metzer, supra note 52, at
538-50. Representative cases include Eckhard v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 547 (10th
Cir. 1950); Deutsch v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 649 (1967), aff'd per
curiam, 405 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1969); Basila v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 111 (1961);
Hall v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 195 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 538 (9th Cir.

1952).
54. See supra note 53.
55. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 71-419, 1971-2 C.B. 220 (directors' fees); Rev. Rul. 69650, 1969-2 C.B. 106 (salary payments); Rev. Rul. 68-86, 1968-1 C.B. 184 (restricted
stock bonus); Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174-76 ex. 1 (additional nonforfeitable
compensation); id. ex. 2 (additional forfeitable compensation); id. ex. 3 (author's
royalties).
56. See supra notes 52-53.
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economic benefit, which arose in the context of employee compensation, 57 to structured settlements. The doctrine originated in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,58 which established that the predecessor to section 61 (section 22a) 59 included as income any economic or
financial benefit conferred upon the employee as compensation,
whatever the form or mode by which it is effected. 0 Over the years,
the doctrine that indirect employee compensatory benefits result in
taxable income was applied most often in the context of determining
the proper tax year for that income.6 A series of cases held that the
purchase by an employer of retirement annuity contracts produced
taxable income to the employee in the year the employer paid the
contract premiums. 2 With the subsequent passage of the liberalized
statutory deferred income provisions,6 3 however, the doctrine came to
have little application to deferred compensation arrangements. 4
Yet the doctrine continued to have independent vitality beyond the
scope of its original setting. Beginning with Burnet v. Logan,6 5 the
economic benefit doctrine has been used to determine the year of
taxation for deferred payments from the sale of property. In Burnet,

57. The concept was not formally recognized until the 1945 case of Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945), but its antecedents extend at least to Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929). The leading case is Sproull
v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 244 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952)
in which the employer in 1945 paid a bank trustee $10,500 in consideration for the
services performed by the taxpayer/employee. The trustee was to pay out approximately one-half the principal and accumulated interest in 1946 and the remainder in
1947. Id. at 245. In holding that the $10,500 was taxable in 1945, the court conceded
that it was not a case of constructive receipt. Instead the court held it taxable in the
year that the taxpayer received the economic benefit in the form of a cash equivalent.
Id. at 247; see Rev. Rul. 62-74, 1962-1 C.B. 68.
58. 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
59. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213, 40 Stat. 1057, 1065 (1919).
60. 279 U.S. at 729.
61. In Old Colony Trust the Supreme Court determined that payment by the
employer of the employee's income taxes constitutes additional taxable income to the
employee in the year payment is made. Id. at 729. The question was not when it was
income, but if it was income. Subsequent cases, see infra note 62, that involved
deferred employee compensation dealt with the issue of when the deferred compensation was income, as Old Colony Trust settled the issue whether such arrangements
constituted additional income.
62. Commissioner v. Bonwit, 87 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 694
(1937); Brodie v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 275 (1942); Yuengling v. Commissioner, 27
B.T.A. 782 (1933), aff'd, 69 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1934); Danforth v. Commissioner, 18
B.T.A. 1221 (1930); Adams v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 381 (1929).
63. I.R.C. §§ 401-404 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

64. See Knight, Income Tax Consequences of Nonqualified Deferred Compensa-

tion, A Recapitalization,21 Tax Law. 163, 172-74 (1967); Metzer, supra note 52, at

538-45; Rizzo, Coping with Constructive Receipt Problems Created by Plan Distribution Elections, 53 J. Tax'n 282 (Nov. 1980).
65. 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
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the sale price for stock included deferred payments keyed to the
tonnage of iron ore extracted from a mine by the purchaser of the
stock.6 The Court held that no income was realized in the year of the
sale because the "promise [of future money payments] was in no
proper sense equivalent to cash. It had no ascertainable fair market
value.16

7

Hence, the transaction was "held open" to await the actual

receipt of the future payments before a determination
was made as to
68
whether the seller had realized any income.
Although the government lost under the particular facts of Burnet,
in dicta the court did approve the government's contention that under
appropriate conditions deferred payments were taxable in the year of
sale. Taxation could precede receipt of the income because the taxpayer received economic
benefit equal to the discounted value of the
69
deferred payments.

In the wake of Burnet, deferred payment sales agreements are
classified either as "open" or "closed" transactions.70 If the deferred
payments have an ascertainable fair market value, 71 the transaction is
"closed" and the gain or loss is recognized in the year of sale. 72
Alternatively, the seller may claim that the sale is an "open" transaction, and report the income only when the value of the payments
received exceeds his basis. 73 Obviously, the latter is a very favorable

66. Id. at 410.
67. Id. at 413.
68. Id. at 413-14.
69. The court did not use the term "discounted value"; rather it asked whether
the tax liability could be "fairly determined." Id. at 412.
70. The following are examples of cases holding under Burnet that a transaction
must be left open: Westover v. Smith, 173 F.2d 90, 92 (9th Cir. 1949); Commissioner
v. Carter, 9 T.C. 364, 371 (1947), aff'g, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948), acq., 1958-2
C.B. 4; Lentz v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1157, 1162-63 (1957), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 6.
Examples of cases holding that the transaction was closed and could be valued for tax
purposes include: McCormac v. United States, 424 F.2d 607, 619-20 (Ct. Cl. 1970);
Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1098, 1107-08 (1959), aff'd, 286 F.2d 850 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961); O'Brien v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 376, 38586 (1955), acq. in part, 1957-1 C.B. 4; see also Rev. Rul. 68-194, 1968-1 C.B. 87, 88
(citing Burnet v. Logan with approval).
71. According to Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1960), it is very rare that property
will have no ascertainable fair market value.
72. See supra note 69 for examples of closed transaction cases. In acknowledgment of the difficulty to the seller of being liable for taxes prior to receipt of the
income, Congress provided relief in the form of I.R.C. § 453 (Supp. V 1981), which
allows for the seller to report the gain pro rata as the payments are received.
73. M. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation 246 (3d ed. 1982). I.R.C. § 453,
which provides the optional installment method, was amended in 1980 to allow
contingent payment transactions to qualify as § 453 installment sales. I.R.C.
§ 453(c) (Supp. V 1981). Hence, the availability of "open" transaction treatment,
with the tax deferred until after the return of basis, may be even more difficult to
sustain. M. Chirelstein, supra, at 247.
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tax outcome for the seller, but one extremely difficult to achieve. A
transaction is considered "open" only if the deferred payments do not
have an ascertainable fair market value in the year of sale. IRS
regulations hold that "only in rare and extraordinary cases will property be considered to have no fair market value" 74 and therefore,
deferred payment sales are in overwhelming numbers deemed
75
"closed" transactions.
1. Applying the Doctrine to Structured Settlements
The doctrine of economic benefit has been addressed and surprisingly rejected by the IRS in the context of periodic payment of damage awards. 76 Surely, however, the claimant who agrees to periodic
payments does in fact receive economic benefit at the time of the
agreement. The transaction must be considered "closed" because the
periodic payments have an ascertainable fair market value, particularly if the payments are secured by an annuity or funded irrevocable
trust. Thus, applying the doctrine of economic benefit to structured
settlements, the claimant would realize income in the year of settlement equal to the discounted value-the ascertainable fair market
value-of the future payments.
Generally, the claimant will demand the protection of a fully
funded trust (or escrow account) or will require the defendant to
purchase an annuity from a financially responsible third party such as
an insurance company. 77 In the case of an annuity, the claimant
78
would have income equal to the cost of the annuity to the defendant.
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1960).
75. The only practical alternative is § 453 treatment. M. Chirelstein, supra note
73, at 247.
76. E.g., Rev. Rul. 79220, 1979-2 C.B. 74.
77. See Choulos, supra note 32, at 75; Elligett, supra note 32, at 144-45; Lilly,
supra note 32, at 246-47.
78. Disclosure to the claimant of the cost of the annuity could cause some
problems, however. The issuer of the annuity may be unhappy about the release of
its price; disclosure of that information may cost the issuer a competitive advantage if
other issuers should learn of the price because the price of an annuity varies from
company to company. See Choulos, supra note 32, at 75. Defendants also may not
appreciate disclosing the price of the annuity because it may have cost less than what
the claimant demanded as a lump-sum settlement. Annuities, supra note 32, at 368.
The cost of the annuity is keyed to the claimant's life expectancy, concerning which
the parties may have quite different opinions. The defendant and the issuer may
estimate a severely foreshortened life expectancy for the claimant because of the
disability. Id. Claimants are likely to dispute the reliability of a foreshortened life
expectancy when applied to their particular case. This is natural not only because of
the normal optimistic view of the victim, but also because the longer the expected
life, the greater the needs of the claimant and therefore the larger the damage award.
In the majority of jurisdictions the defendant is liable for lost earnings determined by
the preaccident life expectancy of the claimant. 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of
Torts § 24.6, at 1293-94 (1956); Levmore, Self-assessed Valuation Systems for Tort
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If, rather than an annuity, the parties rely upon a funded irrevocable
trust or an unsecured promise to pay, valuation would be more speculative, but still determinable. A funded, irrevocable trust, which is
required to pay all its income to the claimant, would complicate the
valuation problem because the rate of return is uncertain. Nevertheless, a solution might be found by analogy to the field of estate and gift
tax, which relies upon valuation tables to determine the present value
of future trust income.7 9 Even an unsecured promise to pay would
have a fair market value, albeit deeply discounted to reflect the risk
factor.
The failure of the IRS and Congress to apply the doctrine of economic benefit to periodic payments becomes even more confusing
upon examination of applications of the doctrine in analogous contexts. For example, one Revenue Ruling held that the discounted
value of prize payments were taxable in the year they were won, even
though before the winner was chosen the contest sponsor had placed
the prize money in an escrow account to be paid over a two-year
period. 0 A similar result was reached in a case in which a father
bought a winning Irish Sweepstakes ticket in the names of his minor
children."' Pursuant to Irish law, the cash prize was held by the Bank
of Ireland until the children reached age 21 or until the bank received
an application for release of the funds. The Tax Court held that under
the doctrine of economic benefit the prize was taxable in the year it
was won, rather than in the year(s) that the children turned twenty82
one or in the year in which application was made for the money.
The argument for applying the doctrine of economic benefit to
structured settlements is even more compelling than in the above
examples. In those situations, the deferred nature of the payments was
and Other Law, 68 Va. L. Rev. 771, 801 (1982). If the reimbursement is by an
annuity, however, the actual payments will continue only for the foreshortened,
post-accident life. Hence, the annuity will cost less than the discounted value of a
comparable lump-sum settlement which assumes that the claimant will have a
normal life expectancy. For example, if prior to the accident the claimant's life
expectancy was 10 years and his earnings were .$25,000per year, his total lost
earnings would be $250,000. If the accident had severely injured the claimant and
reduced his life expectancy to 5 years, than an annuity would need replace only
$125,000 of lost earnings. The purchase of an annuity, rather than payment of a
lump sum-the discounted value of the $250,000-would result in substantial savings to the defendant.
79. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(f) (1970) (providing tables showing valuation factors
for life estates, terms certain and remainders).
80. Rev. Rul. 62-74, 1962-1 C.B. 68.
81. Pulsifer v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 245, 245 (1975).
82. Id. at 246-47 (citing with approval Rev. Rul. 67-203, 1967-1 C.B. 105);
accord Anastasio v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 814 (minor child who won $100,000 in
state lottery was taxable in the year of winning even though by law the prize was
paid to his parents as custodians under the state's Uniform Gift to Minors Act), aff'd,
No. 77-4117 (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 1977).
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fortuitous-they could not have resulted from conscious tax planning
on the part of the recipient. By contrast, the personal injury claimant
plays a major role in determining the nature of the payments he will
receive. He is engaged in settlement negotiations and is represented by
an attorney who presumably will be aware of the income tax ramifications of the settlement options. Why should a claimant accept a
$200,000 lump-sum settlement, for example, when he can realize far
more tax-free dollars by having the defendant purchase an annuity for
$190,000? The failure of the IRS and Congress to apply the doctine of
economic benefit impels the claimant to practice this mode of tax
avoidance.
2. Proposed Methods of Taxing Structured Settlements
If deferred payment damage awards were deemed income in the
year of the settlement, section 104(a)(2) would come into play, with
the result that the fair market value of the settlement would be tax
exempt. Thereafter, the tax effect of the later receipt of the periodic
payments could take either of two routes. The claimant could be
treated as if he had purchased an annuity at a cost equal to present
value of the future payments, i.e., the amount exempted by section
104(a)(2). The periodic payments would then be taxed according to
section 72.83 Under that section, each periodic payment would be
allocated between a tax-free return of capital-the cost of the annuity-and a taxable investment interest component.8 4
In the alternative, the periodic payments could be taxed as are
other closed transactions; the payments would be received tax-free
until they totaled the fair market value of the settlement amount.
Payments in excess of the amount exempted by section 104(a)(2)
would represent taxable income.85 Functionally, the taxable payments
would represent interest income. If this formula were to be applied,
claimants would be taxed the same regardless of whether they accepted a lump-sum settlement or a deferred payment arrangement. In
both cases the interest income would be taxed, and section 104(a)(2)
would neither undercut horizontal equity nor encourage claimants to
accept deferred payments of damage awards.
At present, such encouragement is quite strong. For example, 86 if a
thirty-five year old male claimant receives a $1 million settlement tax-

83. I.R.C. § 72 (1976).
84. Id. § 72(b).
85. See Ginsburg, Taxing the Sale for FuturePayment, 30 Tax L. Rev. 471, 567
(1975); cf. Rev. Rul. 62-74, 62-1 C.B. 68 (a cash prize placed in an escrow account
results in realizable income equal to discounted value. The excess of future payments
received over the discounted value is taxable income in the years received).
86. The example that follows can be found in Hindert, supra note 32, at 9.
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free under section 104(a)(2) and purchases a life annuity with thirty
years of guaranteed payments, he will receive $7,789.22 per month,
or $93,470.64 per year, totalling $2,804,119.20. As a section 72 annuity, the annual payments are apportioned between the nontaxable
return of capital, $25,640.96, and the taxable investment income,
$67,829.68. 87 Arbitrarily assuming his taxable income to be $60,000
and the taxpayer to be married, filing a joint return, the annual tax
will be $17,705. Thus, the taxpayer would have $50,124.68 net aftertax income plus the $25,640.96, yielding 75,765.64 consumable dollars.88 Conversely, if the claimant had rejected a lump-sum settlement, and had insisted upon an annuity purchased by the defendant,
he would have received the $93,470.64 in its entirety. 9
The comparison, however, is of course meaningless; no defendant
would be willing to purchase an annuity costing $1 million. Rather,
the defendant would want to buy an annuity that would pay the
claimant an amount equal to the after-tax dollars that the claimant
would have obtained if he had accepted a lump-sum settlement and
purchased his own, partly taxable annuity-in the above example,
$75,765.64 per year. By doing so, the defendant would receive the
entire benefit of section 104(a) (2)'s failure to tax the interest portion of
periodic payments.
Depending on the particular circumstances and the bargaining
power of the parties, structured settlements will confer the section
104(a)(2) tax savings upon either the claimant, the defendant or both.
To the extent the claimant garners a portion of the tax savings, a
horizontal inequity is created among personal injury award recipients.
Moreover, the potential shift of some or all of the section 104(a) (2) tax
savings to defendants was certainly not one of the purposes behind the
section's enactment. By divesting structured settlements of their favored tax treatment both of these effects could be remedied. Deferred
periodic payments should be treated as either "closed transactions" or
as section 72 annuities.
III.

Is

IGNORANCE BLISS? THE RIGHT TO INSTRUCT JURIES AS TO THE
EFFECT OF SECTION

104(a)(2).

A. The State of the Law Before Liepelt
For years, courts and commentators have debated whether a jury
should be instructed that personal injury awards are tax exempt.9 0
87. I.R.C. § 72(b) (1976) excludes a portion of each annuity payment from gross
income. The excluded portion is a percentage equal to the ratio of the amount
invested in the annuity contract compared to the expected total return under the
annuity contract.
88. Based upon tax rates per I.R.C. § 1 for tax year 1982.
89. Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74.
90. E.g., Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 297 (9th Cir. 1975)
(court must instruct jury); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 148-49, 125
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Under the traditional rule, the jury neither hears evidence nor receives
any instructions concerning the federal income tax consequences of
damage awards. 91 Defendants, in their attempt to overturn tradition,
have argued that absent such instructions, a jury unaware of section
104(a)(2) might inflate an award by an amount that it erroneously2
believes the plaintiff would have to pay in federal income taxes.
Additionally, defendants have sought the right to introduce evidence
as to the effect of income taxes
upon the calculation of damage awards
93
for loss of future earnings.

N.E.2d 77, 84-85 (1955) (jury should not be instructed); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363
Mo. 339, 346, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952) (instruction should be given); Burns, A
Compensation Awardfor PersonalInjury or Wrongful Death is Tax-Exempt: Should
We Tell the Jury?, 14 De Paul L. Rev. 320, 330-32 (1965); Crosby, Impact of
Inflation and Income Taxes on FutureDamages in PersonalInjury and Death Cases,
21 Trial Law. Guide 196, 206-12; (1977); Dennis, Sirmon, & Drinkwater, Wrongful
Death Damages-FairCompensationfor Future PecuniaryLoss Requires Consideration of Economic Trends and Income Tax Consequences, 47 Miss. L.J. 173, 197-203
(1976); Feldman, PersonalInjury Awards: Should Tax-Exempt Status Be Ignored?, 7
Ariz. L. Rev. 272, 279-80 (1966); Kennelly, The Effect of Income Taxes Upon
Earningsin Wrongful Death and Permanent Disability Cases-An Update, 25 Trial
Law. Guide 77, passim (1981); Morris & Nordstrom, PersonalInjury Recoveries and
the FederalIncome Tax Law, 46 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1960); Nordstrom, supra note 1,
at 212-15; Roettger, The Cautionary Instruction on Income Taxes in Negligence
Actions, 18 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1, passim (1961); Comment, Jury Instructions:
Upon Request Court Must Instruct that CompensatoryDamages Are Not Subject to
FederalTax, 56 Minn. L. Rev. 503, passim (1972) [hereinafter cited as Jury Instructions]; Note, Computation of Lost FutureEarningsin PersonalInjury and Wrongful
Death Actions, 11 Ind. L. Rev. 647, 667 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Computation];
Note, Jury Instruction on the Tax-Exempt Status of the Personal Injury AwardDomeracki v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 33 Ohio St. L.J. 972, passim (1972);
Personal Injuries, supra note 4, passim; DamageAwards, supra note 11, passim; 26
Loy. L. Rev. 409, passim (1980).
91. Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Culver v. Slater Boat Co.,
688 F.2d 280, 286 (5th Cir. 1982); Scruggs v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 320 F. Supp.
1248, 1251 (W.D. Va. 1970); Raines v. New York Cent. R.R., 51 Ill. 2d 428, 430,
283 N.E.2d 230, 232, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972); Spencer v. Martin K. Eby
Constr. Co., 186 Kan. 345, 353, 350 P.2d 18, 24 (1960); Louisville & Nash. R.R. v.
Mattingly, 318 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Ky. 1958), aff'd, 339 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1960).
92. E.g., Burlington N., Inc., v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 297 (9th Cir. 1975);
Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1251 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 883 (1971); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 149-52, 125 N.E.2d
77, 85-86 (1955); Dennis v. Blanchfield, 48 Md. App. 325, 334-37, 428 A.2d 80, 8687 (1981), aff'd, 292 Md. 319, 438 A.2d 1330 (1982); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363
Mo. 339, 346, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952).
93. E.g., Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 664-68,
151 Cal. Rptr. 399, 420-23 (1978); Floyd v. Fruit Indus., 144 Conn. 659, 672-73, 136
A.2d 918, 925-26 (1957); Texas & N.O.R. v. Pool, 263 S.W.2d 582, 591 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1953), overruled, Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. McFerrin, 291 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.
1956); see Nordstrom, supra note 1, at 212-13.
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Claimants prove the claimed loss of future earnings by offering
evidence of their past income and pre-accident projected future income. 4 Defendants have argued that the relevant figures for calculating loss of earnings are the past and future earnings of the claimant
net of federal income taxes. 95 Because the damage award is supposed
to place the claimant in the financial position that he would have been
in "but for" the accident, and because the award is tax free, the
claimant, it is argued, would be unjustly enriched unless an award for
loss of earnings is calculated according to after-tax dollars.96
For example, if as a result of the defendant's negligence, a fifty-five
year old male became totally disabled and lost ten work years, and if
his pre-tax, pre-accident wages were $20,000 a year, he would have
lost $200,000 of future earnings. Defendants claim that to calculate
lost earnings in the above manner over-compensates the claimant; it
leaves more income at his disposal than if he had earned the income
and paid taxes. 17 Instead, if lost earnings were determined net of
federal income taxes,9 8 and assuming the claimant's tax rate was 20 %,
he would have had $16,000 of disposable after-tax income each year.
The total after-tax lost earnings would be $160,000, compared with
$200,000 pre-tax, for a difference of $40,000. Defendants contend
that this amount, $40,000 in our example, represents a windfall to the
claimant and an unnecessary and unfair burden on the defendant. 9
Over the years, defendants have had mixed success in introducing
the issue of taxes. Numerous trial courts have refused requests by
defendants to instruct the jury that damage awards are tax exempt.100

94. Hildyard v. Western Fasteners, Inc., 33 Colo. App. 396, 404-05, 522 P.2d
596, 600-01 (1974); Plourd v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 266 Or. 666, 672-80, 513
P.2d 1140, 1144-47 (1973); Byre v. Wieczorek, 88 S.D. 185, 190-98, 217 N.W.2d
151, 155-58 (1974); C. McCormick, Damages 306-07 (1935); Karon, supra note 16,
at 18-19.
95. Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1250 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 180 F.2d 295, 302 (9th
Cir. 1949), aff'd en banc, 186 F.2d 926, cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951); Dempsey
v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 344, 251 S.W.2d 42, 44 (1952). See supra note 94.
96. E.g., Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 288 (9th Cir. 1975);
Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harry Crow & Son, Inc., 6 Wis. 2d 396, 405-07, 94
N.W.2d 577, 581-82 (1959).
97. See 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 77, § 25.12, at 1326-27; Dennis,
Sirmon & Drinkwater, supra note 90, at 197; Feldman, supra note 90, at 272-73;
Morris & Nordstrom, supra note 90, at 274; Nordstrom, supra note 1, at 218-19;
Personal Injuries, supra note 4, at 247-48.
98. See supra note 95.
99. See, e.g., Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 292 (9th Cir.
1975).
100. See supra note 91.
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When the issue has been appealed, the majority of jurisdictions have
held that a refusal to allow an instruction as to the tax-free nature of
damages does not constitute reversible error.' 0 ' Federal circuit courts

101. E.g., Grant v. National Acme Co., 351 F. Supp. 972, 979 (W.D. Mich. 1972)
(personal injury); Combs v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 135 F. Supp. 750, 756-57
(N.D. Iowa 1955) (same); Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, 403-05, 298 P.2d 1034,
1037-38 (same), modified on other grounds, 81 Ariz. 121, 301 P.2d 1032 (1956);
Atherley v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc., 142 Cal. 2d 575, 589, 298 P.2d 700,
709 (1956)(same; not error to refuse but would be within the discretion of the trial
judge to permit); Hildyard v. Western Fasteners, Inc., 33 Colo. App. 396, 406-07,
522 P.2d 596, 602 (1974) (personal injury); Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc.,
159 Conn. 576, 580-82, 271 A.2d 94, 96-97 (1970) (same); St. Johns River Terminal
Co. v. Vaden, 190 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (same; within judge's
discretion), cert. denied, 200 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1967); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v.
Thomas, 125 Ga. App. 716, 721, 188 S.E.2d 891, 895 (personal injury), aff'd, 229
Ga. 301, 190 S.E.2d 898 (1972); Kawamoto v. Yasutake, 49 Hawaii 42, 51, 410 P.2d
976, 981 (1966) (same); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 152, 125 N.E.2d
77, 86 (1955) (same); Highshew v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 507-08, 134 N.E.2d 555,
556 (1956) (same); Richmond Gas Corp. v. Reeves, 158 Ind. App. 338, 362-63, 302
N.E.2d 795, 811-12 (1973) (wrongful death); Spencer v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co.,
186 Kan. 345, 354, 350 P.2d 18, 25 (1960) (personal injury; correct as a matter of
law); Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. Mattingly, 318 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Ky. 1958) (personal injury), aff'd, 339 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1960); Michaud v. Steckino, 390 A.2d 524,
534-36 (Me. 1978) (same); Briggs v. Chicago Great W. Ry., 248 Minn. 418, 430-32,
80 N.W.2d 625, 635-36 (1957) (same); Senter v. Ferguson, 486 S.W.2d 644, 646-47
(Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (same; statutory overruling of instruction permitted in Dempsey
v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952)); Bracy v. Great N. Ry., 136
Mont. 65, 75, 343 P.2d 848, 853 (1959) (personal injury), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 949
(1960); Crecelius v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 144 Neb. 394, 403, 13 N.W.2d 627, 632
(1944) (same); Coleman v. New York City Transit Auth., 37 N.Y.2d 137, 145, 332
N.E.2d 850, 855, 371 N.Y.S.2d 663, 670 (1975) (same); Maus v. New York, C. & St.
L. R.R., 165 Ohio St. 281, 285, 135 N.E.2d 253, 254-56 (1956) (same); Chicago,
Rock I., & Pac. R.R. v. Kinsey, 372 P.2d 863, 867-68 (Okla. 1962) (same); Plourd v.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 266 Or. 666, 680-81, 513 P.2d 1140, 1147-48 (1973)
(same); Dixie Feed & Seed Co. v. Byrd, 52 Tenn. App. 619, 627-28, 376 S.W.2d 745,
749 (1963) (same), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 878 (1964); Stallcup v. Taylor, 62 Tenn.
App. 407, 420, 463 S.W.2d 416, 422 (1970) (wrongful death); Missouri-Kan.-Tex.
R.R. v. McFerrin, 156 Tex. 69, 90, 291 S.W.2d 931, 945 (1956) (same); Norfolk S.
Ry. v. Rayburn, 213 Va. 812, 816-17, 195 S.E.2d 860, 864 (1973) (personal injury);
Boeke v. International Paint Co. (Cal.), 27 Wash. App. 611, 616-17, 620 P.2d 103,
106-07 (1980) (same; will instruct on nontaxability only in case of extreme income);
Crum v. Ward, 146 W. Va. 421, 443-44, 122 S.E.2d 18, 30-31 (1961) (personal
injury); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harry Crow & Son, 6 Wis. 2d 396, 405-08, 94
N.W.2d 577, 581-83 (1959) (same). Cases that have held that an instruction would be
proper include: Abele v. Massi, 273 A.2d 260, 261 (Del. 1970) (wrongful death);
DeBose v. Trapani, 295 So. 2d 72, 74-75 (La. Ct. App.) (personal injury), writ
denied, 299 So. 2d 359 (La. Sup. Ct. 1974); Blanchfield v. Dennis, 438 A.2d 1330,
1334-35 (Md. 1982) (same, citing Liepelt); Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J.
466, 484, 494-95, 341 A.2d 613, 623, 628-29 (1975) (wrongful death); Geris v.
Burlington N., Inc., 277 Or. 381, 394-97, 561 P.2d 174, 182-83 (1977) (FELA
personal injury but looked to federal law-held not reversible error to omit such
instruction but in future should be given if requested).
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have split on the issue, with five circuits upholding the trial judge's
held
refusal to allow the instruction,10 2 while two other circuits have
10 3
that a refusal of such instruction constitutes reversible error.
As for allowing evidence of the effect of taxes on the past and future
earnings of the claimant, courts have shown even more reluctance.
Only nine states permit the defendant to offer evidence of the effect of
taxes and thereby prove the claimant's loss of after-tax, consumable
income. 10 4 Here again, the federal circuits have split, with the major-

102. Circuits upholding the lower court's refusal to allow such instruction:
Taenzler v. Burlington N., 608 F.2d 796, 802 (8th Cir. 1979) (personal injury);
Kennett v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 560 F.2d 456, 462-64 (1st Cir. 1977) (wrongful
death); Bach v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 502 F.2d 1117, 1123 (6th Cir. 1974)
(wrongful death; not error to refuse, but would be within the discretion of the trial
court); Raycraft v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry., 472 F.2d 27, 33 (8th Cir.
1973) (personal injury; refusal to resolve issue); Nichols v. Marshall, 486 F.2d 791,
794 (10th Cir. 1973) (personal injury and wrongful death; not error to refuse, but
would be within discretion of trial court); McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
282 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.) (personal injury), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
103. Courts holding that refusal constitutes reversible error: Burlington N., Inc. v.
Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 297-98 (9th Cir. 1975) (personal injury; instruction when
requested); Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1251-52 (3d Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); see Plant v. Simmons Co., 321 F. Supp.
735, 740 (D. Md. 1970) (same).
104. The following jurisdictions permit the defendant to introduce evidence of the
effectof taxes on earnings: Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 1005 (6th Cir.
1975) (applying Florida's wrongful death statute); Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494
F.2d 173, 184-85 (1st Cir. 1974) (wrongful death applying Rhode Island statute);
Mosley v. United States, 405 F. Supp. 357, 360 (E.D.N.C. 1974) (wrongful death
applying North Carolina law but noting that there had been no previous state cases
dealing specifically with the question of admissibility of evidence of the effect of
income taxes), affd, 538 F.2d 555 (4th Cir. 1976); Floyd v. Fruit Indus., 144 Conn.
659, 671-73, 136 A.2d 918, 925-26 (1957) (wrongful death action); Gorham v.
Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 582, 271 A.2d 94, 97 (1970) (personal
injury action limiting the holding of Floyd to consideration of tax evidence in
wrongful death actions only); Adams v. Deur, 173 N.W.2d 100, 105 (Iowa 1969)
(wrongful death action); Morgan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 323 So. 2d 855, 862 (La.
Ct. App. 1975) (personal injury case stating that in awarding loss of future wages,
court has option of using gross, net or any figure in between), appeal dismissed, 325
So. 2d 282 (La. 1976); Miller v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 410 Mich. 538, 564,
302 N.W.2d 537, 545 (1981) (applying Michigan no fault insurance statute and
survivor's act); Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466, 484-85, 341 A.2d 613,
623 (1975) (wrongful death action); Varney v. Taylor, 79 N.M. 652, 655-56, 448
P.2d 164, 167 (1968) (wrongful death action). In the following personal injury cases,
the courts expressly disallowed the introduction of evidence of the effect of taxes in
computing lost earnings: Caron v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 378, 397 (D.R.I.),
aff'd, 548 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1976); Combs v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 135 F.
Supp. 750, 751 (N.D. Iowa 1955); Seely v. McEvers, 115 Ariz. 171, 174, 564 P.2d
394, 397 (Ct. App. 1977); Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d
626, 664-68, 151 Cal. Rptr. 399, 420-23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Seaboard Coast Line
R.R. v. Thomas, 125 Ga. App. 716, 721, 188 S.E.2d 891, 895, aff'd, 229 Ga. 301,
190 S.E.2d 898 (1972); Rouse v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 349 Ill. App. 139, 150-
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of evidence on the effect of federal income
ity refusing the admittance
05
taxes on future earnings.1
Commentators agree that the wiser course is to instruct juries that
damage awards are tax exempt because such knowledge is relevant

and necessary to the calculation of a just damage award."' Greater
51, 110 N.E.2d 266, 271-72 (1953); Spencer v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 186 Kan.
345, 353, 350 P.2d 18, 24 (1960); Lumber Terminals, Inc., v. Nowakowski, 36 Md.
App. 82, 96-97, 373 A.2d 282, 291 (1977); Griffin v. General Motors Corp., 403
N.E.2d 402, 406-08 (Mass. 1980); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 342-43, 251
S.W.2d 42, 45-46 (1952); McGee v. Burlington N., Inc., 174 Mont. 466, 477, 571
P.2d 784, 790-91 (1977); Louissaint v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 111 Misc. 2d 122,
128, 443 N.Y.S.2d 678, 681-82 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Eriksen v. Boyer, 225 N.W.2d 66,
73-74 (N.D. 1974); Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. Miller, 486 P.2d 630, 636 (Okla.
1971); Plourd v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 266 Or. 666, 680-81, 513 P.2d 1140,
1147-48 (1973); Oddo v. Cardi, 100 R.I. 578, 585, 218 A.2d 373, 377 (1966); Byre v.
Wieczorek, 88 S.D. 185, 195-97, 217 N.W.2d 151, 157-58 (1974); Dixie Feed & Seed
Co. v. Byrd, 52 Tenn. App. 619, 627, 376 S.W.2d 745, 749, cert. denied, 379 U.S.
878 (1964); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 594 S.W.2d 496, 506 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979), aff'd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 453 U.S. 473 (1981); Hoge
v. Anderson, 200 Va. 364, 367-68, 106 S.E.2d 121, 124 (1958); Hardware Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Harry Crow & Son, 6 Wis. 2d 396, 405-07, 94 N.W.2d 577, 581-82 (1959).
Some cases have allowed evidence on the effect of income taxes for amounts received
as past wages, while forbidding such evidence with respect to amounts received for
future wages. E.g., Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 177-78 (3d Cir.
1977); Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 672-73 (Alaska 1967). In the following
wrongful death cases the courts expressly disallowed introduction of evidence of the
effect of taxes in computing lost earnings: Spinosa v. International Harvester Co. 621
F.2d 1154, 1158 (1st Cir. 1980) (construing New Hampshire law); Gushen v. Penn
Cent. Transp. Co., 280 A.2d 708, 710 (Del. 1971); Torchia v. Burlington N., Inc.,
174 Mont. 83, 96-97, 568 P.2d 558, 566 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978);
Smith v. Pennsylvania R.R., 99 N.E.2d 501, 504 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950); MissouriKan.-Tex. R.R. v. Miller, 486 P.2d 630, 636-37 (Okla. 1971); Girard Trust Corn
Exch. Bank v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 410 Pa. 530, 538, 190 A.2d 293, 297-98
(1963) (both wrongful death and personal injury); Texas Consol. Transp. Co. v.
Eubanks, 340 S.W.2d 830, 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Hinzman v. Palmanteer, 81
Wash. 2d 327, 333-34, 501 P.2d 1228, 1232-33 (1972) (en banc) (not admissible
unless claimant had extremely high earning capacity).
105. Blue v. Western Ry., 469 F.2d 487, 496 (5th Cir. 1972) (personal injury; no
adjustment for income need be made at lower or middle reaches of income scale),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 956 (1973); Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d
1245, 1251-52 (3d Cir.) (personal injury), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); United
States Steel Corp. v. Lamp, 436 F.2d 1256, 1273-74 (6th Cir. 1970) (wrongful death;
no adjustment necessary), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971); Boston & Marine R.R.
v. Talbert, 360 F.2d 286, 291 (1st Cir. 1966) (same); McWeeney v. New York, N.H.
& H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 35 (2d Cir.) (personal injury; no adjustment for income need
be made at the lower or middle reaches of income scale), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870
(1960); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Curl, 178 F.2d 497, 502 (8th Cir. 1949) (personal
injury). Circuits that would admit evidence of the effect of income tax: Mosley v.
United States, 538 F.2d 555, 558-59 (4th Cir. 1976) (limited to wrongful death);
Runyon v. District of Columbia, 463 F.2d 1319, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (applying
D.C. survivor's statute).
106. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 90, at 282; Computation, supra note 90, at
667; PersonalInjuries, supra note 4, at 251.
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disagreement exists among commentators, however, concerning the
desirability of introducing evidence as to the effect of taxes on the lost
earnings of the claimant.' 0 7 Those who oppose the introduction of
such evidence cite the belief that the tax savings of section 104(a)(2)
should not inure to the benefit of the defendant in the form of smaller
damage awards.,0 8
Possibly because of the concern that defendants should not benefit
from section 104(a)(2), until recently little progress had been made in
convincing courts to admit evidence of the effect of taxes. 0 9 In contrast, England has allowed the admission of such evidence since
1955.110 In the United States the landmark case may turn out to be a
1980 Supreme Court decision, Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v.
Liepelt."'1

B. The Liepelt Decision
In Liepelt, the Court held that in a suit under FELA,1 2 it was
reversible error to refuse to instruct the jury that damage awards are
exempt from federal income taxes." 3 The Court further held that it
was reversible error to exclude evidence of the effect of federal income
taxes in determining the damages suffered by the plaintiff from the
loss of future earnings. " 4 As stated succinctly by Justice Stevens: "It is
his [the plaintiff's] after-tax income, rather than his gross income
before taxes, that provides the only realistic measure of his ability to
support his family.""15
107. The following commentators favor introduction of evidence of the effect of
taxes on earnings: Brin, Economic Projectionsin Determination of Damages: Inflation and Income Taxes, 24 Fed'n Ins. Couns. Q. (No. 4) 14, 19-22 (1974); Dennis,
Sirmon & Drinkwater, supra note 90, at 197-202; Feldman, supra note 90, at 272-73;
Morris & Nordstrom, supra note 90, at 276-77; Jury Instructions, supra note 90, at
506-07; Computation, supra note 90, at 687-90; Personal Injuries, supra note 4, at
251. The following commentators oppose introduction of evidence of the effect of
income taxation: Levmore, supra note 77, at 813-14; Nordstrom, supra note 1, at
227-30; Damage Awards, supra note 12, at 296-97, 301.
108. Damage Awards, supra note 12, at 296-97. Other rationales include: Kennelly, supra note 90, at 97 (incidence of tax is a collateral matter which should not be
considered because it is too speculative and because the jury is not apprised of the
various other deductions which will affect the amount recovered); Levmore, supra
note 77, at 813-14 (arguing awards based on gross earnings provide optimal deterrence for the tortfeasor); Nordstrom, supra note 1, at 227-30 (citing judicial convenience).
109. See supra notes 92-93.
110. British Transport Comm'n v. Gourley, [1955] 3 All E.R. 796, 805-06.
111. 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
112. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
113. 444 U.S. at 498.
114. Id. at 494. However, the Court stated that introduction of such evidence may
not be necessary if the impact of future income tax in calculating the award would be
de minimis. Id. n.7.
115. Id. at 493.
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In rejecting the majority rule on exposure to the effects of federal
taxes, the Court made short shrift of the time-honored argument that
income taxes are too speculative or too complex for a jury to calculate. 116 The Court pointed out that future earnings also are subject to a
variety of vicissitudes, including unemployment, health problems and
inflation, and thus calculation of lost future earnings is necessarily a
matter of "estimate and prediction." 1" 7 The Court rejected as irrelevant the argument that taxes should be ignored because plaintiffs are
not reimbursed for attorney's fees." 8 Justice Stevens concluded that
the determination of a plaintiffs future income tax liability can be
presented to juries in an understandable manner, thanks to the "practical wisdom of the trial bar and the trial bench.""l 9
Justices Blackmun and Marshall dissented in a thoughtful opinion
authored by Blackmun in which he reasoned that instructions to the
jury about the tax-free nature of the damages should be governed by
state law. 120 Since the case arose in Illinois, which does not require
such instructions, Blackmun stated that it was "not error to refuse to
2
instruct the jury as to the nontaxability of the award.' '
Blackmun's hostility to such instructions ran even deeper, however.
He would, as a general rule, bar instructions about the tax-free nature
of damage awards because the "decision . . . opens the door to [the]
possibility" of "[c]harging the jury about every conceivable matter as
to which it should not misbehave or miscalculate."' 22 The Justice was
silent as to what bogey men he saw lurking on the horizon, but he
probably meant such matters as attorney's fees, costs for expert witnesses and other expenses of litigation that reduce the amount of a
2 3
damage award that actually accrues to the benefit of the plaintiff.
Justice Blackmun was somewhat more compelling in his objection
to the use of an after-tax figure to calculate lost earnings. He viewed
the section 104(a)(2) non-taxability of damages as evidence of congressional intent to bestow a benefit upon plaintiffs. 2 4 Blackmun cited
two possible reasons that may have motivated Congress to grant the

116. Id. at 494.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 495-96.
119. Id. at 494.
120. Id. at 503-04 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 504 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 503 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
123. These arguments were, in fact, raised by the respondent in the Liepelt case.
Id. at 495. Other courts and commentators have also cited these objections. See, e.g.,
McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 870 (1960); Louissaint v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 111 Misc. 2d 122, 12930, 443 N.Y.S.2d 678, 682-83 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Feldman, supra note 90, at 276.
124. 444 U.S. at 500 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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section 104(a)(2) tax exclusion windfall to plaintiffs. First, "Congress
may have decided that it is simply not worthwhile to enact a complex
and administratively burdensome system in order to approximate the
tax treatment of income if, in fact, it had been earned over a period of
time by the decedent."1 25 The Justice cited no authority for this proposition and in fact no evidence
exists that Congress, or even the IRS,
26
ever held such a view.'
Blackmun's other probable explanation for the congressional section
104(a)(2) largesse seems closer to the mark. He suggested that "Congress may have intended to confer a humanitarian benefit on the
1 27
victim or victims of the tort."'
This may well explain the continued
existence of section 104(a)(2).128 Undoubtedly, many congressmen
would find it harsh indeed to force an accident victim to share his
damage award with Uncle Sam. They would prefer to forego the
revenue, rather than face a newspaper headline that read: "Victim
loses arm to train, must pay $200,000 in taxes." Moveover, because a

damage award is designed to make the plaintiff "whole again," the
public, not attuned to concepts of basis, realization and involuntary
conversion, is unlikely to rue the victim his tax-foregone "windfall" at
the cost of a lost arm.
C. The Ramifications of Liepelt

1. Extending Liepelt Beyond FELA Cases
The Supreme Court opinion in Liepelt should control in all FELA
actions whether the claim is for wrongful death or for personal injury. 1 9 The effect of Liepelt, however, is likely to be felt beyond
125. Id. at 501 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
126. The House Ways & Means Committee Report, H.R. Rep. No. 767, 65th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1918), which accompanied H.R. 12,863, the Revenue Act of
1918, simply stated that "under the present law it is doubtful whether amounts
received .

.

. are required to be included in gross income." Upon consideration of

H.R. 12,863 by the House, § 213(b), the predecessor of § 104(a)(2), was accepted
without comment and repeatedly passed over during the sessions in which the bill
was considered for amendment and review. The only amendment to § 213(b) was
offered on Sept. 3, 1918, and proposed to eliminate taxation of life insurance payable
to a corporation. 56 Cong. Rec. 10371 (1918). T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev.
457 (1918) exempted personal injury recoveries from inclusion in gross income prior
to the passage of the Revenue Act of 1918.
127. 444 U.S. at 501 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
128. See supra notes 2 & 4.
129. See 444 U.S. at 492-93. Post-Liepelt decisions by lower courts, however, have
split on the extent to which the Liepelt holding is applicable to FELA actions. Some
courts have correctly chosen to apply Liepelt to all FELA actions involving either
wrongful death or personal injury claims. O'Byrne v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 632 F.2d
1285, 1286-87 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Lang v. Texas & P. Ry., 624 F.2d 1275,
1279 (5th Cir. 1980); Cazad v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 622 F.2d 72, 76 (4th Cir.
1980); Oltersdorf v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R., 83 Ill. App. 3d 457, 464, 404 N.E. 2d

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

FELA cases. The statutory language of FELA governs wrongful death
and personal injury actions brought under the Jones Act 30 (recovery
for injury or death of seaman). Therefore, Liepelt will affect the
calculation of damages for suits brought thereunder.13 1 Similarly, the
measure of damages under the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOSHA)1 32 is1 33
the same as the measure of damages for wrongful death
under FELA.
Additionally, at least theoretically, Liepelt could have an impact on
civil rights actions brought under section 1983 of title 42.134 A section
1983 damage award does not represent a reimbursement for a personal injury per section 104(a)(2) and a civil rights award that represents back pay are taxable. 35 Neither the courts nor the IRS, however,
has addressed the question whether a civil rights award that does not
represent back pay is taxable. Arguably an award that represents
damages for injury to constitutional rights is in essence a recovery of
capital and should therefore be nontaxable. Although courts measure
section 1983 damages by referring to common-law damage rules,
federal law governs section 1983 actions. 36 To the extent that a
section 1983 award is nontaxable, then following Liepelt, the jury
should be instructed that the award is tax free.
Liepelt represents a statutory interpretation of the FELA and was
not decided on a constitutional basis. 37 Therefore, while binding
precedent in FELA and similar actions brought in state and federal

320, 325 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981). Other courts have limited the
Liepelt holding to FELA wrongful death cases and have held it inapplicable to FELA
personal injury cases. Flanigan v. Burlington N., Inc., 632 F.2d 880, 890 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981); Marynik v. Burlington N., Inc., 317
N.W.2d 347, 351 (Minn. 1982). In Marynik, the court based its decision upon
footnote seven of Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 494, which stated that introduction of evidence
of tax may be excluded in some cases if the impact of future income taxes in
calculating the award would be de minimis, causing more confusion than it is worth.
317 N.W.2d at 350-51.
130. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
131. See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 38 (1943);
Nesmith v. Texaco, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 561, 563-64 (W.D. La. 1980).
132. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
133. Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 788 n.12 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed,
434 U.S. 801 (1977); National Airlines v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400, 403-04, 404 n.4 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
135. See Watkins v. United States, 223 Ct. Cl. 731, 731 (1980); Hodge v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 616, 620-21 (1975); Rev. Rul. 72-341, 1972-2 C.B. 32.
136. See Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 408-09 (1964); Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 TermForeword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10-26 (1975); Special
Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of Action
and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 Cornell L. Rev. 1011, 1024, 1029 (1980).
137. See 444 U.S. at 492-93.
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courts, Liepelt is not binding in state cases involving common law
actions based on state statutes or in diversity actions brought in federal
courts.' 3 8 In actions brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA),139 state law governs the measure of damages. 140 The measure
of damages under state law is, however, limited by federal statutory
law which provides that damages are to be compensatory, and not
punitive. 4 1 Because Liepelt is not binding on issues of damages under
state law, it should not be controlling in FTCA actions.
Prior to Liepelt, however, not all courts awarded damages in
FTCA actions according to state law. Some federal circuits were
allowing income tax evidence in FTCA actions, despite contrary state
law, under the theory that failure to do so would result in punitive
damages. 142 Other courts have looked to state law first, and if it was
silent have applied a federal rule. 143 Still other courts have looked
solely to the federal law of the circuit, in some cases citing44 an overriding federal interest as the reason for ignoring state law. 1
Because they awarded damages on theories other than state statutory or common law, these decisions indicate that Liepelt may have a
greater-than-exTpected effect on the measure of damages for cases
brought under the FTCA. Although such cases are tried without
juries, 145 rendering the Liepelt holding as to jury instructions inapplicable, Liepelt can nonetheless be applied to allow evidence on the
calculation of lost earnings.
146
In a wrongful death case under the FTCA, the Ninth Circuit,
citing Liepelt, held that an amount of money must be added to an
award to reflect the income tax that will be paid on interest earned on

138. Vasina v. Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1981); Croce v.
Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1096 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981
(1981); Spinosa v. International Harvester Co., 621 F.2d 1154, 1158 (1st Cir. 1980);
Louissaint v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 111 Misc. 2d 122, 128, 443 N.Y.S.2d 678,
681 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1365-66 (Wyo. 1981); see
South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819, 827-28 (N.D. 1980).
139. The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
140. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976), "the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred" is applicable.
141. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
142. See Felder v. United States, 543 F.2d 657, 668-70 (9th Cir. 1976); Hartz v.
United States, 415 F.2d 259, 264 (5th Cir. 1969); O'Connor v. United States, 269
F.2d 578, 584-85 (2d Cir. 1959).
143. See, e.g., Deweese v. United States, 576 F.2d 802 (10th Cir. 1978); Mosley v.
United States, 405 F. Supp. 357 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
144. E.g., United States v. Sommers, 351 F.2d 354, 360 (10th Cir. 1965);
Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981, 1014 (D. Hawaii 1965), aff'd, 381 F.2d
965 (9th Cir. 1967).
145. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976).
146. DeLucca v. United States, 670 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1982).
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a lump-sum award. 147 Another Ninth Circuit case concluded that in a
FTCA case involving personal injury, lost income should be calculated
net of taxes. 1 48 Similarly, a federal district court held that in a personal injury suit under the FTCA, Liepelt would be controlling if the
court were considering the loss of support suffered by the wage earner's dependents. 149 Other unexpected results of Liepelt include decisions to apply it to diversity and state action cases. 50 One state court
followed Liepelt in an action controlled by state law, and cited in its
reasoning the desirability of a uniform state-federal rule. 151
2. Benefiting Defendants Contrary to Congressional Intent
By reducing damage awards for lost earnings to a figure net of
taxes, the Liepelt holding will cause defendants to become beneficiaries of the section 104(a)(2) tax exemption. It is true that the Liepelt
rule will benefit defendants only as to part of their liabilities, since
out-of-pocket damages or damages for pain, suffering or loss of limbs
are not affected. Still, it is doubtful that Congress ever intended
section 104(a)(2) to reduce the financial burdens of personal injury
defendants.
If section 104(a)(2) was initially passed as an aid to claimants, or if
its continued vitality can best be defended as an intentional federal
subsidy to tort victims, then its ability to perform that humanitarian
function has been severely undercut by Liepelt. Moreover, if the states
continue their gradual shift' 52 toward allowing juries to be instructed
as to the tax-free nature of damage awards, and to calculate damages
for lost earnings as an after-tax amount, then the states will also
frustrate the congressional purpose behind section 104(a)(2). Instead
of subsidizing claimants, the section 104(a)(2) tax forbearance will
subsidize those who ultimately pay for the defendant's torts: the casu-

147. Id. at 845-46.
148. Hollinger v. United States, 651 F.2d 636, 643 (9th Cir. 1981).
149. Erickson v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 646, 652 (D.S.D. 1980).
150. See Nesmith v. Texaco, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 561, 563-64 (W.D. La. 1980)
(holding that the circuit rule established in Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d
234 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975), to use gross income in determining
loss of future earnings in personal injury cases is now overruled by Liepelt). Since
Nesmith, Johnson has been explicitly overruled by Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688
F.2d 283, 286 (5th Cir. 1982).
151. Blanchfield v. Dennis, 438 A.2d 1330, 1334 (Md. Ct. App. 1982).
152. In 1958, there did not appear to be any state cases allowing admission of
evidence of income tax. See Nordstrom, supra note 1, at 213 n.3. By 1982, at least
nine states permitted admission of evidence of income tax, at least in wrongful death
cases. See supra note 104. In 1958, only one state allowed an instruction to the jury
on the taxability of the award. See Nordstrom, supra note 1, at 213 n.3. As of 1982,
six states permitted the jury to be instructed as to the taxability of a damage award.
See supra note 101.
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alty insurance company. Although not every tort suit is aimed at the
deep pockets of a casualty insurer, most are. 15 3 The noninsured or
minimally insured defendant is likely to be a judgment-proof defendant. 5 4 Certainly, the dramatic million dollar settlement must be paid
by an insurer (or a self-insuring institution) if the plaintiff is to have
any hope of collecting the award. 55 Liepelt, therefore, apparently
signifies a fortuitous windfall for the casualty insurers of America.
3. Liepelt's Swinging Pendulum
Depending on the facts presented and on a court's application of the
holding, Liepelt may prove less advantageous to defendants than
generally believed, and could redound to the benefit of claimants. The
Liepelt requirement that lost future earnings be calculated net of taxes
should lower the amount of damages for which the defendant is
liable. But, it inferentially follows that the effect of taxes should be
included in all calculations concerning the damage award. As stated
by counsel for the plaintiff in Liepelt, "in discounting the estimate of
future earnings to its present value, the tax on the income to be earned
...is now [prior to Liepelt] omitted."' 5 6 Justice Stevens agreed and
admitted that, "[1]ogically, it would certainly seem correct that [the
like future wages, should be estimated on an
present value] amount,
1 57
after-tax basis."'
If the estimated rate of return on the principal to be paid to the
claimant is reduced to reflect taxes, then the discount rate should be
lowered and the principal sum to be paid the claimant would be
raised. Thus, while the future amount of the lost stream of earnings
declines if it is calculated net of taxes, the present value of those same
earnings increases if the discount is also calculated net of taxes.
For example, assume a claimant suffered ten lost work-years and
lost earnings of $20,000 per year for a total of $200,000. Under
Liepelt, the lost earnings should be calculated net of taxes. Assume a
15% tax rate, or after-tax yearly earnings of $17,000 for a total of
$170,000 lost future earnings. The defendant's liability will be the
discounted present value of $170,000 earned ratably over ten years. If

153. Cf. O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and
Suffering in Return for Payment of Claimants'Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. Ill. L. Rev.
333, 340 (the vast majority of automobile tort claims are paid by insurers; tortfeasors
are generally judgment-proof beyond the limits of their liability insurance).
154. One study indicated that only 1.2% of automobile accident tort liability
payments came from uninsured sources. A. Conrad, J. Morgan, R. Pratt, C. Voltz &
R. Bombaugh, Automobile Accident Costs and Payments 48 (1964).
155. Atiyah, No Fault Compensation: A Question That Will Not Go Away, 54
Tul. L. Rev. 271, 288 (1980).
156. 444 U.S. at 495.
157. Id.
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we assume a discount rate of 10% then the defendant will owe
$104,458; if the claimant invests the $104,458 at an annual rate of
interest of 10%, he can consume $17,000 a year for the ten years. At
the end of the ten years the fund will be exhausted.
However, if he invests the lump-sum award to yield a 10 % rate of
return, the claimant will be taxed on that interest income. Hence, the
after-tax rate of return-the consumable interest income-will not
amount to $65,542 over the ten-year period. Rather the after-tax rate
of return will be 10% less the claimant's post-accident, post-settlement rate of return. If we suppose a 10 % rate of taxation (less than
the 15 % pre-accident rate in acknowledgement of the lower amount
of post-accident taxable income), then the claimant will earn only
58,988 after tax consumable dollars on the lump-sum settlement. This
means that the claimant would have only $16,345 per year for ten
years. To ensure that the claimant will have $17,000 a year to spend,
the defendant would have to pay $109,100 as a lump-sum settlement
amount. The increase in the lump-sum amount, from $104,458 to
$109,100 ($4,642) reflects the effect of lowering the discount rate from
10 % to 9 %; the latter being the discount rate net of a tax rate of 10 %.
If the damage award in part represents anticipatory payments for
future expenses, the cost of those expenses will not be reduced on
account of taxes, but the earnings on the present value of the reimbursement damage payment will be reduced by taxes. For example, if
the claimant anticipates annual medical expenses of $2000 per year for
ten years for a total of $20,000, the cost to the defendant for reimbursement of the $20,000 of medical expenses would be the present
discounted value of $20,000 or $12,289, assuming a 10% discount
rate. However, because the claimant will be taxed on the interest
income earned on the lump sum, the rate of discount must be lowered
to reflect a lower after-tax, consumable rate of investment return. If
we assume a 15% tax rate, the discount rate becomes 8.5% and the
present discounted value of the $20,000 is $13,728.
Thus, Liepelt requires a larger payment by the defendant to provide adequate reimbursement for the future expenses of the claimant.
In cases in which the award is primarily due to damages other than
for the loss of future earnings, the defendant's liability will increaseif
the effect of taxes is included in the damage award calculation. Even
if the damage award represents only reimbursement for the loss of
earnings, the defendant may still owe more to the claimant if taxes are
considered than if they had been ignored.
On the other hand, while a lower rate of discount increases the
present value of future lost earnings or future expenses, a lower discount rate diminishes the amount owed to the claimant for damages
that occurred prior to the payment of the award. 158 For example, if
158. Under the traditional rule, prejudgment interest was not allowed for
amounts due for bodily harm or pain and suffering. Restatement (Second) of Torts
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the claimant was injured in 1977, and incurred $20,000 of out-ofpocket medical expenses, but judgment and payment did not take
place until 1982, the defendant might owe five years of interest on the
$20,000 damage award. If the rate of discount is 10%, then the
defendant would owe $20,000 plus $12,210 interest, for a total of
$32,210. However, if the claimant had received the $20,000 in 1977
and invested to yield 10 %, the interest would have been taxed. If we
assume that the claimant's effective tax rate was 20 %, then the rate of
discount would be 8 %. That is, to put the claimant in the same
position that he would have been in had reimbursement been forthcoming at the time of the incurrence of the $20,000 expense would
only require reimbursement of the after-tax lost interest of 8%.
Hence, the defendant would owe only $20,000 plus $9387 interest, a
total of $29,387; a savings of $2823 or 8.89 %.
Concern that Liepelt might increase a defendant's liability is not
mere conjecture. The Ninth Circuit, in reliance on Liepelt, has held in
two cases that the calculation of damages for loss of earnings must
include additional amounts to compensate for taxes on the investment
income that will be earned on the award.1 59 Reducing the loss of
future earnings to reflect the effect of taxes, and adding an amount to
compensate for income taxes on the projected investment income
slightly more than if taxes had been
resulted in the defendant owing
160
left out of all calculations.
Only a few commentators' 6 1 have noted the possible perverse results
of Liepelt, one of whom offered the following example. 162 Assume a
thirty-year old male with a thirty-two year work-life expectancy,
earning $20,000 when he became totally disabled. Assume further
that his annual income would increase by 10 % per year, and that the
proper rate of discount was 10 % (ignoring the effect of taxes). Finally, assume the average effective tax rate to be 25 %. Prior to Liepelt
(ignoring taxes), the present value of the lost earnings would be
$640,000.163 However, if the lost earnings are calculated net of taxes,
then earnings after-tax begin at $15,000, increased by 10 % per year,
while the 10 % discount is reduced to 7.5%. Put another way, the
10 % rate of interest that the claimant can expect to earn on the
§ 913(2) (1977). Some states have passed statutes that allow prejudgment interest.
E.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-123 (1979); Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44 (1953). For
an extended discussion, see Comment, The Availability of Prejudgment Interest in
PersonalInjury and Wrongful Death Cases, 16 U.S.F.L. Rev. 325 (1982).
159. DeLucca v. United States, 670 F.2d 843, 846 (9th Cir. 1982) (FTCA);
Hollinger v. United States, 651 F.2d 636, 642 (9th Cir. 1981) (same).
160. DeLucca v. United States, 670 F.2d 843, 846 (9th Cir. 1982).
161. See Benich, The Reverse Tax Effect in Wrongful Death or Injury Estimates,
17 Trial 16 (May 1981); Crick, supra note 12, passim.
162. Crick, supra note 12, at 27172.
163. Id. at 272.

598

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

principal sum paid to him will yield 7.5% after taxes. Under these
assumptions the present value of the lost earnings would be
$717,905,164 an amount greater than if Liepelt were not applied and
the effect of taxes were ignored-$717,905 versus $640,000.
Changes in any of the factors, such as the level of earnings growth,
rate of the discount, number of years of lost earnings or the assumed
effective tax rate, will determine whether the inclusion of the effect of
taxes favors the defendant or the claimant. 6 5 Assume, for example, a
fifty-year old with a fifteen year work-life expectancy who is totally
disabled, and who earned $20,000 a year. Assume an annual income
growth of 10%, a rate of discount of 8% and a tax rate of 10%. If
taxes are ignored, the defendant would owe the claimant $367,121.
But if taxes are included, then the defendant owes only $325,795, a
savings of $51,326 or 14 % .166
Liepelt will usually work to the advantage of the defendant, may
occasionally have little effect on the outcome, and can, under appropriate circumstances, actually favor the claimant. Analysis of the
variables yields the following generalizations: 16 7
1) If an award for future damages does not include loss of future
earnings, Liepelt favors the claimant, since the claimant must
be reimbursed for the effects of taxation upon the earnings
arising from the lump-sum payment."'
2) The greater the proportion of future damages that consist of lost
earnings, the more Liepelt will work to the advantage of the
defendant. 6

9

164. Id.
165. See infra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
166. To illustrate further, assume a fifty-five year old disabled claimant with a ten
year work-life expectancy who earned $20,000, with projected earnings growth of
8% per year, a discount rate of 8%, and an effective tax rate of 10%. Before taxes
the defendant would owe $200,000. After taxes the defendant would owe $186,165, a
savings of $13,835 or 7%. If all the variables remain constant, except that the lost
work years increase to fifteen (from ten), then the defendant's liability before taxes
would be $300,000, but after taxes it would be $284,566, for a savings of $15,434 or
5.1%.
167. See Crick, supra note 12, at 273, for a similar, but abbreviated, series of
generalizations.
168. For example, assume the claimant is awarded damages only for future medical expenses estimated at $5000 per year for 20 years or a total of $100,000. If the rate
of discount is 8%, the present value of $5000 for 20 years is $49,091. If taxes are
taken into account and if the claimant's income tax rate was 18.75 %, then the rate of
discount, net of taxes, would be 6.5 %, and the present value of $5000 per year for 20
years would be $55,093. A net gain to the claimant of $6002 ($55,093$49,091 = $6002).
169. Assume the claimant suffers $200,000 of damages consisting of $100,000 loss
of earnings ($5000 per year for 20 years) and $100,000 of medical expenses ($5000 per
year for 20 years).
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3) To the extent the award is for damages incurred prior to the
settlement, Liepelt favors the defendant. If the damages represent pre-settlement
lost earnings, the defendant is twice
10
blessed. 7
4) The greater the number
of lost work years, the less Liepelt
1
favors the defendant.' '
5) The level of the effective tax rate is most critical when the
number of lost work years is relatively few. A high tax rate
would favor the defendant,2 particularly if the pre-tax rate of
1
discount is relatively high.
6) The higher the relative initial rate of projected wage growth
and the rate of discount the greater the present value of the lost

(a) If the rate of discount is 8% the present value of the $200,000 of damages
would be $98,181.
(b) If taxes are taken into account and the claimant's tax rate is 18.75% then the
rate of discount is 6.5%, and the loss of earnings would be reduced to $81,250
($100,000 less 18.75% rate of tax). The present value of the damages would be
$99,849.
(c) Same assumptions as (b) except that the damages consist of $150,000 in future
lost earnings and $50,000 of medical expenses. Assuming a 6.5% after-tax rate of
discount and an 18.75% tax rate, the after-tax loss of earnings would be $121,875.
The present value of the damages would be $94,640.
170. For example, (a) assume damages of $100,000 all incurred prior to the date of
the settlement. None of the damages represent lost earnings, and the damages were
incurred at a rate of $20,000 per year for 5 years. If the defendant is required to pay
an interest rate of 10% on the accumulated damages then the total award will be
$122,102.
(b) Same facts as (a) except that taxes must be taken into account. Assume the
claimant's tax rate is 15% so that the rate of interest owed by the defendant is
lowered to 8.5%. The damage award would be $113,806.
(c) Assume the same facts as (a) except that the claimant's damages consist of
$80,000 in lost past wages and $20,000 of other damages. Assume a 15 % tax rate; the
lost earnings net of taxes are reduced to $68,000, total damages $88,000. The damage
award would be $104,286.
171. For example, (a) assume the claimant lost five work years in which earnings
per year were $20,000. Assume a 20 % tax rate and a pre-tax rate of discount of 10 %;
after-tax rate of 8%. After-tax yearly earnings thus equal $16,000, with a five-year
total of $80,000; present discounted (after-tax) value equals $63,883. If Liepelt did
not apply, the loss would equal $100,000, discounted to $75,816. A savings for the
defendant of $11,933 and a ratio of 84% ($63,883: $75,816).
(b) Same facts as (a) above except that the claimant lost 15 years of earnings.
After-tax present value would equal $136,848. Pre-tax present value would equal
$152,100. A savings for the defendant of $15,252 but a ratio of 90% ($136,848:

$152,100).
172. For example, (a) assume the claimant lost five work years in which earnings
per year were $20,000. Assume a 20 % tax rate and a pre-tax rate of discount of 10 %;
after-tax rate of 8 %. After-tax lost earnings total $80,000; present discounted (aftertax) value equals $63,883. If Liepelt did not apply, the loss would equal $100,000,
discounted to $75,816. This is a savings to the defendant of $11,933.
(b) Same facts as (a) above except that the tax rate is 40 %. After-tax lost earnings
total $60,000, discounted (6% rate) to $50,548. Thus, saving the defendant $25,268.
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future earnings; hence the less value Liepelt is to the defendant. 173

Liepelt, apparently little appreciated or understood, has received a
mixed reception. Several state appellate courts have confronted the
1 74
issues raised in it, but for the most part have rejected its reasoning.
Since Liepelt, only one state has accepted the view that the jury
should be instructed that damage awards are tax exempt.17 5 Fewer
state courts since Liepelt have dealt with the right to introduce evidence of the effect of taxes upon lost earnings, but almost all have
stance and continued to refuse to admit such
taken a conservative
7
evidence. 1
Apparently, Liepelt does not signify a rapid change in state rules
concerning consideration of the effect of taxes on damage awards.
Still, Liepelt is significant for federal law. Its holding will apply not
only to FELA cases, but to any claim arising under federal tort law
that involves the loss of earnings, 17 7 including cases brought under the

173. Crick, supra note 12, at 271-72, provides the following example: (a) Assume
the claimant lost thirty-two work years. His annual earnings at the time of the
accident were $20,000. Pre-tax rate of discount is 6 %, projected growth in earnings
is 6% per year, and tax rate of 25%. The present discounted value would be
$613,015.
(b) Same facts as (a) above except both the discount and the rate of growth are
10 %. Present discounted value would be $717,905. That amount exceeds the present
discounted value of the future lost earnings, $640,000, if taxes were ignored.
174. State court decisions refusing to apply the Liepelt holding on jury instructions
to an action based on state law include: Griffin v. General Motors Corp., 403 N.E.2d
402, 407 (Mass. 1980) (personal injury; not error to refuse instruction but would be
within discretion of the trial judge); Tennis v. General Motors Corp., 625 S.W.2d
218, 227-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (personal injury; court refused to follow Liepelt
holding in other than a FELA action); South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290
N.W.2d 819, 827 (N.D. 1980) (personal injury; instruction not necessarily improper);
Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 628 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982)
(personal injury; remanded from 453 U.S. 473 (1981) to determine if Louisiana law
requires instruction on tax; held not error to refuse instruction as under Louisiana
law instruction is discretionary); Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1365-67 (Wyo.
1981) (personal injury; instruction not required).
175. Blanchfield v. Dennis, 438 A.2d 1330, 1334-35 (Md. Ct. App. 1982) (medical
malpractice injury; error to refuse jury instructions approved in Liepelt).
176. E.g., Louissaint v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 111 Misc. 2d 122, 128, 443
N.Y.S.2d 678, 681-82 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (personal injury). But see Curtis v. Finneran,
83 N.J. 563, 569, 417 A.2d 15, 18 (1980) (wrongful death; finding that state law
required using net earnings and citing Liepelt with approval).
177. In Liepelt the majority noted that damages in FELA cases are a matter of
federal concern, 444 U.S. at 493 (citing Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S.
59 (1913)). The Liepelt holding was later held to create a federal common-law rule,
to be applied to actions based on federal statutes that contain no explicit choice of
law provisions. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 486-87 (1981).
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Jones Act, 178 the DOSHA,' 7 9 the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act,'8 0 and possibly under section 1983.181 Liepelt has even been held
to apply to the calculation of damages under the FTCA although by
statute, state law should control. 18 2 Thus, Liepelt is having an effect,
although perhaps not as swiftly or dramatically as one might have
thought.
It will be interesting to see whether those few jurisdictions that
admit evidence of the effects of taxation will concur with the Ninth
Circuit and also calculate the rate of discount 8net
of taxes, as Justice
3
Stevens intimated in dictum would be logical.1
4. Liepelt's Encouragement of Structured Settlements
Since Liepelt generally, but not always, favors the defendant, it
may be to the defendant's advantage, given the facts of a particular
case, not to request that the effect of taxes be included in the calculation of damages. But if the jurisdiction follows the logic of Liepelt,
and the jury is not only instructed that the award is tax free (an
instruction that can only benefit the defendant), but also is provided
evidence of the effect of taxes on lost earnings and on the rate of
discount, what course of action should the defendant pursue? Not
going to trial may be his best approach, as a structured settlement
might prove far more financially favorable.8 4 If, as is almost always
178. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). The Jones Act has been held to incorporate all
judicial principles developed under FELA. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Trawler Racer,
Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1960); Cox v. Dravo Corp., 517 F.2d 620, 622 n.2 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1020 (1975).
179. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see, e.g., Solomon v. Warren,
540 F.2d 777, 788 n.12 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977);
National Airlines v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400, 403-04, 404 n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 885 (1959).
180. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Under OCSLA, the adjacent state's law applies to the area of the sea covered by the Act unless it is inconsistent with federal law. Id. § 1333(a)(2). In Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453
U.S. 473 (1981), the Court faced the issue of whether Liepelt would override state
law if the state law did not require that juries be instructed concerning the effect of
taxes. The Court did not decide the issue, but remanded the case to the Texas Court
of Civil Appeals for a determination whether the applicable state law required the
instruction, and, if it did not, whether Liepelt would override it. Id. at 488.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See supra notes 134-36 and
accompanying text.
182. The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). State law governs the measure of
damages as directed by 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). The measure of damages under
state law must be compensatory, however, and not punitive. Id. § 2674; see, e.g.,
DeLucca v. United States, 670 F.2d 843, 844 (9th Cir. 1982); Hollinger v. United
States, 651 F.2d 636, 642 (9th Cir. 1981).
183. 444 U.S. at 495.
184. It is, of course, impossible to generalize as to when a defendant should settle
rather than litigate a case. The defendant must weigh the uncertainty of winning at
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the case, the jurisdiction does not allow periodic payments of a judgment,'- the defendant may be better off settling and agreeing to

deferred, periodic payments. Settlement may be preferable if the
claimant's tax rate will lower the rate of discount used to calculate the

present value of the future damages. A structured settlement in the
form of an annuity worth $100,000 to the claimant would cost the
defendant less than the discounted value of $100,000. The rate of
discount used to calculate the cost of the annuity would be at the
higher pre-tax rates because the issuer of the annuity would not be
taxed on the income used to meet the periodic payment obligations. 86
To demonstrate: Suppose the claimant is awarded damages for lost
earnings at a rate of $20,000 per year for ten years and for future
medical expenses at $5000 per year for 10 years, for a total of
$250,000. If the claimant's effective tax rate is 15%, the after-tax
value of the lost earnings is $17,000 per year or $170,000. Total aftertax damages would equal $220,000. If the pre-tax rate of discount is

10%, the after-tax rate would be 8.5% (10% net the claimant's 15%
tax rate). Assuming an 8.5 % rate of discount, the present value of the
damages is $144,350. On the other hand, if the defendant settled and
agreed to pay $22,000 per year for 10 years ($17,000 per year for lost
earnings plus $5000 per year for medical expenses), the cost or present
value to the defendant would be only $135,180. The difference betrial versus the smaller, but certain cost of a settlement. Even if the defendant is
almost certain to lose at trial, he might still choose to litigate in the hope of convincing the jury to award an amount less than that for which the claimant was willing to
settle.
185. Structured settlements or periodic payments may be freely bargained for by
the parties. If the claim proceeds to trial and judgment, however, the parties will
likely face the Hobson's choice of a lump-sum award. In 1980 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws approved the Model Periodic Payment of
Judgments Act, 14 U.L.A. 20 (Supp. 1983). Although no state has adopted the Act, at
least one state has enacted a statute that allows judgment damages to be awarded in
the form of an annuity plan. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.56.240 (Supp. 1982). Absent
specific statutory authority, courts are barred from awarding periodic payments for
future damages. Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
afJ'd sub nom. Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972); Elligett, supra note
32, at 132-33. Several states have adopted statutes that allow periodic payment of
judgments arising from medical malpractice actions. E.g., Ala. Code § 6-5-486
(1975); Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 6864 (Supp. 1980); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2609
(1976). Periodic payments are also available under workmen's compensation statutes.
Stone, Separate Trials, DeclaratoryRulings and Installment Damages: A Compara-

tive Study, 35 Tul. L. Rev. 597, 603 (1961).
Many state "no-fault" statutes also call for some form of payment of the benefits as
the future losses actually accrue. E.g., Fla. Stat. § 627.736(4) (1972 & Supp. 1981),
amended by 1982 Fla. Laws c. 243; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 34M (West
1975); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:6A-4(b) (West Supp. 1982). For an extensive discussion of
periodic payment statutes and proposals, see Elligett, supra note 32.
186. The amounts paid to fulfill the terms of the annuity will be deductible from
the taxable income of the company which sold the annuity. I.R.C. § 832(c) (1976).
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tween $144,350 and $135,180 represents the effect of the claimant's
taxes on the discount used to calculate the present value to the claimant, versus a 10 % rate of discount used to calculate the cost to the
defendant to purchase an annuity that will pay the requisite annual
amounts.
Including the effects of taxes on damage awards thus makes structured settlements more attractive to both claimants and defendants,
particularly if the jurisdiction does not provide for periodic payments
of judgments. Thus, Liepelt strongly encourages structured settlements for personal injury claims because the interest income component of the settlement annuity escapes taxation while the interest
earned on lump-sum payments is taxed.
The two previously existing motives for the adoption of a structured
settlement were: 1) its lower cost for the defendant (compared to a
comparable value lump-sum settlement); and 2) the tax-free nature of
the interest income which would have been taxable had the claimant
accepted and invested a lump-sum payment. After Liepelt, some
defendants will have another compelling reason to favor a structured
settlement. If the jurisdiction follows the logic of Liepelt, then the
purchase of an annuity by the defendant will forestall the increase in
the amount of lump-sum damages that would result from the decrease
in the rate of discount. Hence, Liepelt means more structured settlements, which means greater horizontal tax inequity.
D.

A Proposed Solution

The uncertain effects of Liepelt, particularly the possibility that the
section 104(a) (2) exemption will redound to the benefit of defendants,
could be eliminated if Congress agreed to tax amounts paid as compensation for lost income. Merely overruling Liepelt is no solution
because state courts would be free to instruct juries that lost income
compensation is tax exempt and, therefore, to reduce damage awards
proportionately. Moreover, repeal of the section 104(a)(2) exemption
for compensation for lost income would not only avoid the unfortunate by-products of Liepelt, but would also produce tax equity between personal injury claimants and non-injured wage earners.
Removal of the section 104(a)(2) tax exemption for lost income
damages, however, would result in a serious income-bunching problem if the claimant accepted a lump-sum settlement as compensation
for lost wages. Although income averaging under sections 13011304187 would be available for recipients of significant damage
awards, the modesty of the relief offered by those sections would
hardly seem fair.""' More targeted and tailored sections would be in
187. I.R.C. §§ 1301-1304 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
188. The amount of income subject to averaging is the taxable income of the
current year which exceeds 120 % of the average taxable income for the prior four tax
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order. Relief sections need not be cut from whole cloth, as parallel or
analogous relief sections currently exist.
For example, in the case of trusts that accumulate income, sections
666 and 667189 provide a means for determining the additional tax due
upon distribution without the laborious necessity of recalculating the
additional tax owed for each of the years in which it was earned.19 0
Under section 667(b), the additional tax is determined by calculating
the tax that would have been owed by reference to a three-year base
period. 19 1 Similarly, reimbursement for lost income could be taxed at
a rate equal to the taxpayer's average effective rate paid in selected tax
years prior to the injury.
Taxation of pension plans offers another analogy. Individuals at
retirement have the option under section 402192 either to treat the
distribution as capital gains income, and thereby avoid taxation on
60 % of the income, 9 3 or to elect the special ten-year income averaging provided by section 402(e).19 4 Particularly instructive as to how
damage awards might be taxed is the right of a recipient of a lumpsum pension to completely defer taxation by rolling-over the distribution into a qualifying eligible retirement fund per section 402(a), and
have the income taxed only as it is withdrawn from the retirement
fund. 95 The use of a rollover fund effectively allows the taxpayer to
convert a lump-sum distribution into a multi-year taxable annuity
with the taxpayer determining the rate of the disbursement of the
income, and, therefore, the probable rate of taxation. 9 , In short,
Congress has ample ways to tax lump-sum income without subjecting
it to unduly high marginal rates.
CONCLUSION

The section 104(a)(2) tax exemption represents an understandable
congressional desire to confer a humanitarian benefit on tort victims.
Recent events, however, call into serious question the continued desirability of section 104(a)(2) as currently enforced and interpreted. The
years. Id. § 1302. The tax on that amount is five times the increase which would have
resulted from adding 20 % of the averageable income to 120 % of the average taxable
income of the four previous tax years. Id. § 1301 (1976).
189. Id. §§ 666-667 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
190. Id. § 667(b)(1).
191. Id. § 667(b)(1)(C) (1976).
192. Id. § 402 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
193. Id. § 1202(c) (Supp. V 1981).
194. Id. § 402(e)(1)(C) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
195. Id. § 402(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981).
196. The individual retirement annuity to which a lump-sum pension distribution
may be rolled-over is defined by § 408(b). Among the choices open to the annuitant
are to select a single life annuity or to choose a smaller paying annuity that will pay
for the greater of two lives: the annuitant or his spouse. Id. § 408(b)(3) (1976).
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increased use of structured settlements coupled with the unfortunate
effects of the Liepelt holding require that both the IRS and Congress
rethink their position on section 104(a)(2).
The 1983 amendment to section 104(a)(2) codifies the IRS policy of
excluding from gross income the interest portion of deferred reimbursement payments for personal injuries, a policy which has created
horizofital inequities among personal injury claimants. Congress
should repeal the 1983 amendment and apply the doctrine of economic benefit to periodic payments of damage awards. This would
divest structured settlements of their favored tax treatment and eliminate horizontal inequities among tort claimants.
Moreover, Congress should amend section 104(a)(2) to repeal the
tax exemption for amounts paid as compensation for lost income. This
reform would avoid the complicated interplay of numerous variables
introduced by the Liepelt holding. By removing this obstacle and
bringing section 104(a)(2) into conformity with generally accepted tax
theory, personal injury claimants and defendants could put away
their tax codes and concentrate on fundamental issues of liability and
the calculation of damages.

